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ABSTRACT
After a decade of significant military and financial assistance by the international
community to create a viable state in Afghanistan, serious questions have been raised
about the Afghan state’s viability and whether it remains vulnerable to collapse after the
withdrawal of foreign forces. State collapse, however, runs contrary to the Realist
theory’s conception of states as unitary actors in international relations. Despite the
theory’s primary focus on states and their security, it neglects to provide an explanation
of the state type or acknowledge the presence of “failed” states and their impact on
international relations. To explore this paradox, this thesis takes a historical look into the
emergence of state decay in Afghanistan by using Rotberg’s and Foreign Policy
Magazine’s indicators for state failure.
Realism’s focus on the state’s outward behavior largely ignores the state’s origins
and composition. While the theory’s emphasis on state centrality may be sufficient in
explaining state behavior in homogenous, stable, and developed nations, it’s not adequate
in delineating the behavior of fragile states. The formation of a legitimate state
presupposes that citizens regard the state to serve as the ultimate political authority. The
failure of the Afghan state, however, illustrates that upending a highly delicate balance of
power between a weak state and a highly fragmented society can intensify the struggle
for social control, lead to conflict and ultimately threaten the integrity of the state. This
underscores the argument that not all states are deeply rooted in the social, cultural and
political identity of the nation or enjoy the same level of legitimacy, a key ingredient for
establishing a viable state. International efforts to mitigate security threats by helping
vii

resurrect failed states are likely to face significant hurdles as long as core issues such as
the struggle for social control remain unaddressed. Thus, the Afghan state is likely to
remain fragile and embody a system of government that’s based more on kinship and
patronage befitting a tribal society rather than a rational-legal system based on the
Weberian nation-state model.

viii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The concept of state building has become the means by which the international
community has attempted to tackle state fragility in various corners of the globe. The ideal-type
referred to when attempting to do this – both in theory and in practice – has been that of the
traditional nation-state model put forward by Max Weber. The motivation behind the
international community’s efforts to help bolster fragile states is in large part based on the belief
that functioning states, among other benefits, won’t pose global security challenges to the rest of
the world. This thinking seems to have formed the basis for the global community’s multifaceted
effort to help bolster the Afghan state.

1

However, after more than a decade of international

efforts aimed at creating a strong centralized state capable of protecting its territorial integrity
and providing its citizens with basic services, the Afghan state is still regarded as fragile.2 The
planned departure of International forces from Afghanistan in 2014 has prompted many to
question the durability of the current state and whether it remains vulnerable to collapse.
A historical review reveals that for much of its modern history, the Afghan state has
suffered from ethnic fragmentation and varying degrees of conflict and instability due in large
part to divisions between modernizers and traditionalists. These divisions became more evident
in the summer of 1928, when the Afghan King Amanullah emulating Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in
Turkey, attempted to introduce modernizing reforms that included the establishment of a
Western-style constitutional monarchy, strengthening the nation-state model, and the abolition of
the veil. Most of King Amanullah’s proposed reforms were rejected by the clergy and the tribes,

1

Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London ; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 202-203

2

Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers,
1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 685.

1

plunging Afghanistan into a political crisis. An insurrection spearheaded by the Shinwari
tribesmen followed, resulting in burning down the King’s palace and forcing him into exile.3
The Afghan state during the subsequent four decades, however, remained largely
peaceful as it pursued a policy of accommodation with its highly conservative and tribal society
by maintaining a delicate balance of power. Nevertheless, the 1978 coup by the Soviet-backed
Afghan modernizers upended this delicate balance of power and set off a chain of events that led
to a fundamental shift in the nature of the Afghan state, transforming it from a historically weak
state to one that’s been described as failing, failed or even rogue. Rubin describes the 1978 to
2001 period as a time when Communism and Islamism had much in common, not because they
were both extremisms but because both were radical responses by elites trained for a world they
could not join. He adds, “The administrative structure of the Afghan state from 1879 to 1978
represented the balance of power within and around Afghanistan.”4 Saikal asserts that the
Afghan communist rulers’ inability to incorporate moderate Islam into a culturally relevant
ideology of state building and modernization, helped raise sharp tensions between modernizers
and religious traditionalists in the 1980s intensifying state fragility. 5 Ewans adds that Afghan
elites found their most effective expression as a communist movement whose attacks on religion
and attempts at imposition of secularism, prompted Afghan tribes to rebel.6

3

Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 17–19.

4

Barnett R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 14.
5
6

Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 3–4.
Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, 2nd ed. (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 161–177.

2

Despite the emergence of state decay in 1978, the role of the state during Afghanistan’s
two decades of conflict varied in exercising political authority, maintaining a monopoly on the
use of force, and providing basic public goods.7 8 While the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (1978-1992) provided certain political goods such as education and health care
services, and maintained relative monopoly on the use of force in much of the urban areas, its
successor, the Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992-1996) suffered from a lack of functioning
government institutions, police units, and judiciary.9 The state’s monopoly on the use of force
was severely diminished by armed factions who descended the capital city into a state of
lawlessness. 10 The subsequent Taliban regime, (1996-2001) while establishing its monopoly on
the use of force, presided over a dilapidated government bureaucracy that possessed neither the
means nor the capacity to provide much governance. Although, the Taliban government lacked
professional governing mechanisms, it successfully utilized the state’s security apparatus to
enforce its puritanical interpretation of Islam and consolidate its rule through brutal force.11
This thesis’s main hypothesis is that despite Realism’s insistence on state centrality,
Afghanistan illustrated rising levels of state decay as socio-political divisions deepened the rift

7

Wyler, Liana ,“Weak and Failing State: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research
Service, August 2008, p. 2-5
8

Ibid., 15.

9

Raymond A. Milen, Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005, p. 3-6
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub600.pdf
10

"Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001". Afghanistan Justice Project. 2005.
http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity19782001.pdf
11

"The Taliban's War on Women. A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan". Physicians for Human
Rights. 1998. http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/talibans-war-on-women.pdf
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between state and society.12 I will argue that while Realism provides perceptive analytical
insights into the inner-workings of mostly Western state-system, the socio-political
fragmentation of Afghanistan from 1978 through 2001 undermines the Realist conception of
state centrality with respect to countries outside this model.13 Realist tradition will serve as the
paper’s conceptual framework because of the school’s emphasis on the centrality of state and its
implicit conception that the state as an institution is distinct from society writ large and
purposive in character.
This thesis will argue that although Realist theory’s treatment of the state may have been
sufficient in explaining state behavior in homogenous, stable, and developed nations, it’s not
adequate in delineating the behavior of all states, especially failed states, given the enormous
amount of differences among them. It is, therefore, recommended that by taking into account not
only international constraints on the state but also domestic challenges, a more comprehensive
and integrated approach to the analysis of state behavior will emerge. As Rosenau points out the
state is complex and multifaceted in origin, function and in behavior. Like any multidimensional
object, the state reveals different sides to different observers, suggesting the state’s foreign
policy behavior differs from the one implied by a Realist state that seeks “the national interest
defined in terms of power.”14 While Realism focuses on the state’s outward behavior, in large
part it ignores its origins and composition because not all states are deeply rooted in the social,

12

Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics,
And the Way Ahead: Findings from an International conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007, Conference
Proceedings (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 24.
13

Ibid.

14

Laura Neack, Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J:
Prentice Hall, 1995), 118–119.
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cultural and political identity of the nation. This undermines the Realist conception that all states
act in a similar manner.15
This thesis will focus on the role of domestic constraints such as social structure, social
control, and national identity to examine the challenges of building a viable state. State decay in
Afghanistan illustrates that political instability varies along a continuum from declining public
support for state institutions, to popular uprisings and revolutionary upheaval, posing a direct
threat to the integrity of the state as a unit. Domestic weakness and fragility would almost
certainly derail state goals on the international arena. Internationally weak states are more
constrained than powerful ones to reach their goals through international action.16 Thus, the
foreign policy objectives of fragile or failed states where institutions of the state have crumbled
or collapsed differ significantly from powerful states.

Failed states are too occupied with

domestic challenges to pursue a coherent foreign policy strategy. Thus, their foreign policy
objectives are limited in scope. Since such states lack effective institutions and political
dominance is claimed by those who can control the symbols of the state irrespective of their
ability to administer complex state institutions with complex roles that have effectively ceased to
exist, they find it easier to establish their legitimacy in the sphere of foreign policy as much can
be done with words alone. For example, Soffar notes that Iraq’s foreign policy in the postSaddam Hussein era was devised as a tool for the creation, rather than a manifestation of
sovereignty.17

15
16

Ibid., 192.
Mastanduno et. al, Toward a Realist Theory of State Action, International Studies Quarterly, (1989), 33, 457-474

17

Bahgat Korany and Al al-D n il l essouki, eds., The Foreign Policies of Arab States (American University in
Cairo Press, 2010), 224.

5

Research into the Afghan state’s history of dilapidation, resulting from social
fragmentation and violent conflict will raise pertinent questions about classical and neoRealism’s assumptions regarding the unitary and rational nature of the state. This paper will
contrast the fragmentation of the Afghan state to Realism’s lack of lucidity on state type, and its
failure to take stock of failed states and their impact on international politics. The emergence and
effects of failed states on international relations runs counter to Realism’s assumption that
political differences within the state are ultimately resolved authoritatively, and that the
government will speak for the state as a whole because the state is a unitary actor capable of
making rational decisions based on preference ranking and value maximization.18
This thesis will be segmented into quartiles.

The first chapter will expound on a

theoretical debate regarding the centrality of state within Realist thought including both classical
and neo-Realism. To illustrate some of the inherent constraints responsible for state weakness in
Afghanistan, and the state’s inability to assert its dominance over society, the second chapter will
include a broader discussion of weak states and strong societies with particular focus on state
building challenges in the Middle East. This discussion is especially pertinent given the region’s
social, cultural and religious commonalities with Afghanistan. The third chapter will offer a
comparative analysis of state failure under three regimes, spanning from 1978 to 2001, by
examining socio-political, security, economic and other relevant factors to assess the degree of
governance under each government. This chapter will also provide the main arguments of the
thesis. The fourth chapter will employ Robert Rotberg’s and Foreign Policy Magazine’s social,
political, security, and economic indicators for state failure as a guide to assess the emergence
and severity of state failure under the rule of the aforementioned three regimes. Lastly, this
18

Graham T Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New
York: Longman, 1999), 24–25.
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chapter will link the paper’s conceptual framework to the emergence and severity of state failure
in Afghanistan, and assess the prospects for building a viable Afghan state.
Realism, Neo-Realism: State-Centrality, but what State?
Historically, philosophers ranging from Machiavelli to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,
Max Weber, and John Stuart Mill have held a variety of views about the state and its functions.
However, the model that has emerged as the basis for today’s world order is that of the “nationstate” model as championed by Max Weber during the 1918 revolution in Bavaria.

Weber

understood the state as a human community that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force within a given territory, and noted the intimate relationship between the state and
violence.19 A state, according to Max Weber is that agency within society, which possesses the
power to regulate the monopoly of legitimate violence. The idea behind this is that in certain
“well-ordered” societies, exercising private means of violence is illegitimate, and the central
governing authority may be the only party to perpetrate violence.

20

According to Lockhart,

Weber articulates a clear and functional view of the state, and describes its basic functions as the
legislature, the police, the judiciary, and the various branches of civil and military
administration.21 In such a model state institutions are distinct from civil society, having their
own interests, preferences and capacities.22

19
20

Max Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (New York, N.Y: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 969.
Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. (New York, N.Y: John Wiley and Sons; 2006) ,13.

21

Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States: a Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford ; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 116–117.
22

Achim Wennmann, Grasping the Strengths of Fragile States: Aid Effectiveness between ‘Top-down’ and
‘Bottom-up’ Statebuilding, Swiss Agency for evelopment and Cooperation (S C) and the Centre on Conflict,
Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, CCDP Working
Paper No. 6, 2010, p. 16, available at:
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/Working%20paper_6_BD.pdf.

7

Realism as a rich and well-established theoretical perspective in International Relations
(IR) dominates the field to a great extent and is often portrayed as the “rational” view of IR
against which all other perspectives should be judged. To help us determine the viability and
utility of Realism’s assumptions, it would be appropriate to closely examine some of its key
assumptions, particularly its emphasis on the centrality of state in international relations.
The theory provides a guide to action based on the guiding principles of Realpolitik in the
interests of the preservation of the nation-state. Thus, Realism focuses on states as actors and
analyzes international politics in terms of “units” called states. In fact, the theory uses the terms
unitary “actors” and “states” interchangeably. During the last several decades, particularly after
the Second World War, Realism has emerged as accepted wisdom in IR because of the clear
lessons that the conflict appeared to underline.23 Realists argue the history of world politics has
shown that writing treaties or establishing international organizations was less important than the
struggle for power and security which was carried out under the motto of every nation-state for
itself, underlining the assumption that the pursuit of power and national interest are the major
forces driving international politics.24
Realists are impenitent about asserting that a state’s primary obligation is to its own
citizens, not to a rather abstract international community. Realists do not entirely reject the
viability organizations such of the United Nations or the European Union, just as they do not
deny that limited forms of cooperation do take place and that international institutions may be of
some utility. Nevertheless, international institutions are regarded valuable only to the extent that

23

Phillip J. Barrish, The Cambridge Introduction to American Literary Realism, Cambridge Introductions to
Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
http://www.aucegypt.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=807180.
24

Martin B. Travis, “In efense of The National Interest. By ans J. Morgenthau. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951. Pp. 283.),” The Journal of Politics 14, no. 01 (December 18, 2009): 147.
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they allow states to pursue their own interests.25 Morgenthau asserts, “The overwhelming
majority of states would put the welfare of their own nation above everything else, the interests
of a world state included.”26

e adds that moral principles in the international sphere lack “any

concrete meaning” unless given meaning by the concept of a nation-state.27
espite the theory’s fixation with states as the only actors in international relations,
Realist theory neglects to elaborate or provide an explanation of the state type.

This is

particularly pertinent given the growing number of state failures during the past two decades and
how this phenomenon impinges on international relations. There have been over a dozen cases
of full state collapse in 40 years and 243 partial state failures, conflicts, and crises between 1955
and 1994.

Recent state failures have been exemplified by events of the early 1990s in

Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Liberia. In these instances the institutions of the central state
were so weakened that they could no longer maintain authority or political order beyond parts of
the capital city.28
National Interest Trumps Domestic Politics
Like Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Raymond Aron stress the centrality of state and its
role as unitary actor. They assert that the state’s national interests supersede domestic politics
and societies as well as decision-makers’ beliefs and values. Waltz claims that states are unitary
actors who seek to at the least ensure their survival, “They are unitary actors who, at a minimum,

25

Barrish, The Cambridge Introduction to American Literary Realism.

26

Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf,
1967), 400.
27

Hans J Morgenthau, In the Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 35.

28

Robert Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004),
20.
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seek their preservation and, at a maximum drive for universal domination.”29 He adds that
states’ internal and external efforts to seek their aims consist of “increasing economic capability,
military strength, and developing clever strategies” as well as “strengthening and enlarging one’s
own alliance or weakening an opposing one.”30 Aron points out that politics, insofar as it
concerns relations among states, “seems to signify-in both ideal and objective terms-simply the
survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states.” 31 Aron
also underscores the overarching role of the state by arguing that, “Relations among states,
constitute international relations par excellence”32 and that “the stakes of war are the existence,
the creation or the elimination of states.”33
According to Keohane et al, there are three central arguments within the Realist tradition,
for which the state forms the basis. First, the international system is dominated by sovereign
nation-states, each of whom is beholden to no higher authority but itself, underscoring the
anarchic nature of international relations. Second, inter-state relations are based on competition
though the possibility of cooperation in pursuit of national interest is not excluded.
Consequently, the construct of such a system allows for states to behave resolutely in the pursuit

29

Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1979), 118.
30

Ibid.

31

Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Books That Matter U-640 (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 6.
32
33

Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 7.
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of power and material-being, delineating classical Realism’s primary focus with the sources and
uses of national power in international relations.34
Realists regard the state to be a distinct entity, having been separated from the society
writ large including those claiming to represent it, by a protective shell. Realists refer to
“statesmen” as those who represent the nation-state, and who are predominately concerned with
monitoring and responding to changes in international system. They consider the state to be
distinct from the domestic society because it’s regarded as not only being about the government
responding to the demands and needs of the society. But rather, realists argue that statesmen or
those who represent the state are considered to possess a realm of autonomous behavior.35 As
Morgenthau points out, “They speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives,
choose the means of achieving them, and try to maintain, increase and demonstrate power”.36
Morgenthau adds, however, that the ability to project this power abroad hinges in important
respects on the deftness of state officials in cultivating public opinion, bolstering government
institutions and educating the citizens.37
Realists contend that domestic politics play a supplementary role for sustaining the state’s
goals on the international arena. It is argued that the acquisition of power and wealth would
ensure both the state’s survival and allow it to pursue other goals within a competitive and
anarchic system. Realists are convinced that power can purchase security and other political
goods. As Jacob Viner points out, wealth is a necessary means to power and the two are in long-

34

Mastanduno et. al, Toward a Realist Theory of State Action, International Studies Quarterly, (1989), 33 , 457-474

35

John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 5–15.
36
37

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 118.
Ibid.,
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run harmony.38 Waltz notes, however, that just as for profit firms are free to pursue other
objectives to the detriment of profit maximization, states similarly have latitude to pursue other
goals to the detriment of their chances for continued existence.39 40
Realism posits that the state’s primary objective is to conduct foreign policy and it is this
task that legitimizes and sets apart state representatives from the society writ large. In pursuit of
foreign policy, the state depends on what it can extract from its domestic system, compelling it to
pay much attention to strengthening, shaping and developing the country’s armed forces and
domestic economy. Since Realism assumes that the ultimate objective of the state is survival,
more proximity between the international and domestic goals can be deduced. It can be argued
that together they constitute the minimal goals of the state, namely, its survival since it must
ensure its continued existence prior to pursuing any other objectives.41
Realism’s Enduring Principles: State Survival and External Threats
Realist assumption about state centrality is not limited to classical Realism but has
manifested itself in newer strands of Realism such as neo-Realism. In Man, the State and War,
Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism asserts that there is a timeless, competitive structure
of anarchy, where “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them,”42 The notion of states
existing in an anarchic state of nature, a central tenet of Realism, rose from an interpretation of
thought experiments in Thomas

38
39
40
41
42

obbes’ Leviathan, which views states as if they were

Jacob Viner, International Economics: Studies (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951).
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 92.
Ibid., 221, 160.
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979), 92-95.
Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, 1959, 233-235
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individuals in a “mythical state of nature”,43 in which human beings live in a “state of nature” –
or a condition of war of “everyone against everyone.” In this condition of war, there was a
“continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short.”44 Since there is no international “sovereign,” or Leviathan, and because survival is
paramount in this system, all states must conform and will ultimately behave in similar ways,
that is, they all behave competitively, and deviation from this imperils the state.45
In 1979, Waltz created a new paradigm out of the traditional realist base, coined as
Structural Realism or neo-Realism in his book, Theory of International Politics. Waltz in this
new paradigm calls for a structural interpretation of IR theory. He notes that it’s the structure or
the system that serves as the concept that enables it to determine the expected organizational
consequences of how the units or states interact with each other within the system.46 Waltz’s
theory posits that the structure is dependent on the state for formation and, once it is formed, the
system would indirectly influence the actors and vice-versa creating a self-sustaining structure,
successfully delineating the individual functions and attributes of each. 47 It should be noted that
agency, the interaction of the units with each other as well as with the system, is what defines the
structure. Waltz, in constructing his international theory also evokes the analogy of market
mechanisms. He states that the international system has a similar structure to the market in that
both systems are created through the actions of self-regarding actors. Waltz regards this as the

43

Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. 2010. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and
Beyond. 4th edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. p. 48-50
44
45
46
47

Hobbes Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Michael Oakeshott. New York and London: Collier Macmillan. 1974
Waltz, Theory of International Politics,104.
Ibid., 91-100.
Ibid., 3–19.
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unintended yet inevitable and spontaneously generated outcome of activities by nation-states
concerned primarily with their own survival. States will be concerned; above all else, with
securing their survival.48
Means to Ensure State Survival, Domestic Concerns Only Secondary
While the survival of the state in the international arena requires the defense of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation state, domestically Realist theory demands that
the state must meet emanating challenges and maintain the support of societal groups and
alliances. Realists assume that state officials in their efforts to acquire control over resources coopt and coerce challengers and reward supporters. They add that state officials seek to maintain
their legitimacy which forms the basis for the state to exercise decision making authority because
with more legitimacy they’ll encounter fewer domestic challenges, and be able to exercise more
control over the country’s resources.49
It has been argued that when security pressures are high, a rational actor will significantly
discount the future in order to guard against elimination by stronger rivals. The focus of classical
Realism on the probability and not the possibility of conflict provides for a conception of the
international system as often having lower security pressures than neo-realists assume.
Consequently, classical Realism expects states to often discount the future to a lesser extent than
is assumed by Waltzian neo-Realism, which has often been criticized as a theory that is too
static.50 According to Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive Realism, the focus of global
security is the state. Mearsheimer underscores this point by suggesting that great powers do not
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work together to promote world order for its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own
share of power, which is likely to clash with the goal of creating and sustaining stable
international order.51
Neo-Realism’s static nature reflects its worst-case focus in which the global
understanding of a rational state will have a very short-term focus.52 Consequently, the neorealist theory exhibits some of the same attributes as classic Realism regarding its views of the
state. Waltz argues, "The ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security."53 Waltz
recognizes that the pursuit of security and power do not always coincide and makes his view
explicit that a rational state will seek power only if the security objective has first been ensured.
Mearsheimer, a neo-realist appears to contradict Waltz on this point by asserting that states
ultimately "aim to maximize their relative power."54 Mearsheimer's statement notwithstanding,
his own analyses and hypotheses reflect the view that states ultimately pursue security, not
power, as Waltz argues.
Mearsheimer focuses on the military basis of power, asserting that states aim "to acquire
more military power at the expense of potential rivals."55 Mearsheimer contends that states above
all else seek to maximize their security but, while pursuing this objective, they sometimes will
also enhance their power. The pursuit of power and security coincide only under certain
conditions, particularly when capturing the economic resources of another state is both the
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preferred route to security as well as the least costly means of bolstering power.

56

It is

imperative, however, to point out that in cases where the pursuit of power and security conflict,
Mearsheimer probably would share Waltz's view that states first seek to ensure their military
security before they pursue power. In the end, this prioritization of power and security by
different strands of Realism may be less pertinent as the paper’s focus on state centrality
continues to form the common bond between both the classical Realism and the neo-realist
schools of thought.
The Prevalence of Conflict and State Vigilance
The aforementioned strands of Realism continue their focus on the state, primarily
because they regard states to be self-centered actors that pursue their own interests. They view
international relations as inherently competitive, stressing material factors rather than
nonmaterial factors, such as institutions and ideas. Mearsheimer calls the international system as
a "brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other. The field of
international relations is not in a constant state of war, but is a state of relentless security
competition."57 Similarly, Waltz contends that "threats or seeming threats to ... security abound.
Preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them become a way of life. Relations
remain tense; the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile."58
Neo-realists envision the system to be "one of high risk," although "this is meant not in
the sense that there’s constant war but in the sense that, with each state deciding for itself
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whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out."59 Waltz adds that "in the absence of
a supreme authority, there is then constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force."60
It’s argued that ultimately what’s important is not that conflict is always possible in anarchy, but
rather the relative chance that it will occur. Because failing to fully balance the capabilities of
potential military aggressors does not necessarily result in conflict but rather seem as a rational
approach.
Specifically, within Neo-realism, a rational state shall never let its guards down. The state
should instead adopt a worst case outlook and aim to balance the military capabilities of its
potential aggressors.61 For neo-realists, states are conditioned by the mere possibility and not the
probability of conflict. Neo-realists’ adoption of a worst-case outlook appears to be rooted in a
number of reasons. They believe that the potential costs of conflict as causing actors to focus on
the mere possibility of conflict. As Mearsheimer points out, "Political competition among states
is a much more dangerous business than economic intercourse; it can lead to war, and war often
means mass killing on the battlefield and even mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war
can even lead to the total destruction of the state."62 Neo-realists add that states will ultimately
focus on other states’ underlying potential for aggression as measured by material capabilities
because "intentions are impossible to divine with one hundred percent certainty," and the
possibility always exists that "a state's intentions can be benign one day and malign the next."63
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In the neorealist framework, rational states adopt a worst-case focus since the framework
regards this approach to be the only way to make sure states remain alert and are not caught off
guard. Neo-realists maintain that rational states will focus on the possibility of conflict because
defensive precautions are considered the only true assurance against aggression and conflict and
can be forestalled or even prevented by pursuing appropriate defensive preparations. States are
thus seen as adopting a worst- case approach because it’s presumed that they "do not enjoy even
an imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set out to provide it for themselves."64
The neo-realist view is that rational states’ adoption of a worst-case approach does not
necessarily mean that war is always likely. As Waltz points out, "World politics, although not
reliably peaceful, falls short of unrelieved chaos."65 Although neo-realists don’t maintain that
international relations are in a constant state of war, they nonetheless, underline the central role
of the state in both regulating domestic affairs and international relations.
State Behavior Central, but Domestically Viable?
For Realism, the ontological givens in the international system are states, understood as
unitary, rational actors that operate in an anarchic setting and strive to enhance their well-being
and security. The theory contends that states are constrained only by the external environment,
that is, by the power of other states. Despite its almost exclusive focus on state, Realism fails to
elaborate or expand on state type. Particularly, it neglects to take into account the presence and
impact of failed states on the international system. 66 As the case of Afghanistan illustrates, state
failure is not only a domestic aspect but impinges very much on international relations. Realism,
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however, discounts domestic socio-political considerations and neglects to account for the
presence of failed states and the security threats they pose when considering a state’s national
security priorities. Rather, the theory centers on the state’s national politico-military response to
the threats in confronts in an anarchic environment composed of other nation-states.67
Realism’s treatment of national security as if it were unaffected by domestic constraints
or as if it represented an optimal response to external military pressures in the international arena
neglects to take stock of the serious security threats posed by failed states. The theory’s
insistence on ensuring national security through military and economic power alone, fails to
appreciate the significance of international efforts aimed at addressing security threats that
emanate from failed states. International cooperation aimed at resuscitating the Afghan state in
late 2001 underscores the new organizing principle of the contemporary global system.68 This
requires that state-building, and particularly multilateral state-building, be placed at the centre of
the global security agenda in the hope that reconstituted states would be less likely to pose
security threats to the global system.
As Rubin points out, “The attacks of 11 September 2001 showed that the USA could now
be attacked from even the weakest state and hence reignited US nationalists’ strategic interest in
the periphery. The regime of universal sovereignty, however, requires more powerful states and
international organizations to work through the institutions of national states. Post-war
operations attempt to transform states, rather than absorbing them into other, more powerful,
units.”69 He adds that participant nations in peace building attempt to build acceptable states in
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areas that pose a perceived threat to powerful regional and global actors. The failure of the
Afghan state and its troubles were not limited to within Afghanistan’s borders but had
widespread ramifications for international relations. The failed state of Afghanistan became a
point of consensus among international actors in large part because it united characteristics of a
“rogue state”, of concern to the United States, and a “failed state”, of concern to globalist
humanitarians.70
The Afghan state’s failure and its transformation into a haven for international terrorism
underline the spillover effect of failed states both regionally and globally. The process of
extroverted state formation underlies many changes in the international system, including the
shift from interstate to intrastate warfare and the crises of legitimacy and capacity of postcolonial
states that have led to the collapse of many states. Afghanistan’s rulers while facing many
inherent constraints were able to build a weak state with coordinated flows of foreign aid.
However, deepening socio-political fragmentation and an end to aid flows plunged the country
into civil conflict, ultimately resulting in the collapse of the Afghan state and transforming
Afghanistan from a weak state to an international pariah that threatened the global order with
considerable impact on international relations.71
The Afghan Imbroglio and State Centrality
The severity of state fragility in Afghanistan over two decades will illustrate that contrary
to Realism’s assumptions about states, not all states share such defining characteristics as the
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state being a distinct entity and separated from the society writ large by a protective shell.72 More
importantly, fragmented societies such as Afghanistan do not share the same reciprocal
relationship with the state as is common in the mostly Western state-system. Although, inherent
state weaknesses in Afghanistan illustrate the significance of domestic challenges such as tribal
and ethnic identities and the state’s legitimacy deficit, Realism discounts the presence of ethnolingual identities and communities that are formed in fragmented societies.

Identity and

community in Realist thought are a given because the theory posits that people identify first and
foremost with nation-states.
Identity and Legitimacy
As Chapter III will demonstrate, deepening socio-political fragmentation in Afghanistan
made it increasingly difficult for the state to represent a single identity or community or maintain
at least a minimal level of legitimacy, hastening its collapse. Realists, however, do not attempt
to unpack the processes and practices involved in the building of identity groups and
communities, but rather believe in the dominance of identity and community as a given in IR.
Thus, for realists the only community of any significance in IR is that of a nation-state because
they regard the state to be the best form of political community and beyond the boundaries of the
nation-state lies in the realm of international anarchy where “might makes right”. 73
Although, Realists assume that most people see themselves as American, German or
French, rather than as members of a greater community or sub-units, the disintegration of the
Afghan state demonstrates that ethno-lingual identities such as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek
have played a more dominant role in defining a person’s place within his or her community and
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the society writ large. Hence, despite several attempts by the Afghan state to destroy local
autonomous communities and form a stronger national identity, these communities have
successfully resisted abandoning their ethnic or tribal identities in favor of a national identity or
embracing the nation-state model.

As Shahrani points out, “Emasculated, disarmed and

weakened considerably, most of the communities, especially in rural areas, were nonetheless
able to reconstitute themselves quickly in the face of deteriorating central government power.”74
Maintaining legitimacy is a persistent challenge for all states, especially those with
ambiguous or fragmented identities such as Afghanistan that have come into existence with the
blessing of external legitimators and not because of their capacity to represent a nation or control
a territory.75

The deepening socio-political fragmentation of Afghanistan led to an ever

increasing deficit of state legitimacy, hastening state failure. As Moon asserts, legitimacy
challenges vary in degree and kind, “the widely accepted legitimacy of the state in developed
nations derives from a number of sources often not available to non-core states: a long tradition
of democratic representation and resulting compliance, the material performance of the system,
and a low incidence of social instability.”

76

In contrast to mostly Western nations, many

developing countries are presented with a serious challenge when the state must play an active
role in nation building. As the case of Afghanistan will demonstrate, it’s an intricate task to
establish the legitimacy of weak state when the very nation it’s supposed to embody, is suspect
itself.77
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Societal Tensions
Although, the Realist theory regards domestic political concerns of secondary
importance, the case of state failure in Afghanistan elucidates that in countries with an
ambiguous identity where there’s neither a strong tradition of public service nor a set of
historical precedents to guide and limit claims to national interest, state-society tensions can lead
to socio-political fragmentation and violence, threatening the integrity of the state.

US

anthropologist Louis Dupree, years before the emergence of armed conflict in 1979, identified
rising tension within Afghan society. According to Dupree the conflict manifested itself between
those Afghans that promoted the concept of nation-state and those that desired a more traditional
society based on kinship and tribalism. Dupree defines the nation-state as “in the western sense,
more a set of attitudes, a reciprocal, functioning set of rights and obligations between the
government and the governed – with emphasis on the individual rather than the group”.78 He
writes that “tribalism” occurs “in non-literate societies … when kinship replaces government and
guarantees men and women born into a specific unit a functioning set of social, economic and
political rights and obligations”.79
Shahrani notes that previous attempts at political reforms in Afghanistan during the
twentieth century have not yielded much success in expanding loyalty from clan-based tribal
networks into a concept of nationhood. Limited literacy and infrastructure as well as insufficient
revenue also curtailed the Afghan state’s attempts to broaden its power and control.80
Consequently, contrary to Realism’s assumptions about states as unitary, rational actors that
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share similar motivations, domestic considerations are likely to compel one state to pursue
different goals from those of another state more deeply rooted in indigenous, cultural, political
and social ideas.81
Deepening socio-political tensions in Afghanistan dispute Realism’s emphasis that
domestic political differences within the state are ultimately resolved authoritatively because the
government can speak with one voice for the state as a whole given the state’s unitary and
rational nature and its ability to make rational decisions based on preference ranking and value
maximization.82

83 84

Though, Realism’s assumptions on state centrality and domestic priorities

may be sufficient in delineating state-society relations in mostly Western state-systems, they
ignore the difficulties of transposing the Weberian model of nation-state on highly fragmented
societies where the struggle for social control is not yet settled, and the state remains vulnerable
to disintegration.
Conclusion
Although questions abound, both classical and neo-Realism’s treatment of the state have
imparted a great deal of influence on international relations. However, the theory’s lack of
clarity on state type, and its disregard for the presence and impact of failed states such as
Afghanistan on international relations risks sacrificing ease of continuity for eloquent capacity.
Thus, Realism’s delineation of recurring patterns of international behavior through inter-state
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relations should not discourage scholars from looking inside nation-states that remain prone to
fragility given their impact on international relations. This contrasts with Realism’s treatment of
the internal characteristics of the state as a given. The case of state failure in Afghanistan and its
impact on international relations is a clear repudiation of Waltz’s claim that it is not possible to
understand world politics by looking inside of states.

The emergence of an increasingly

interconnected world clearly demonstrates that heightened fragility or disintegration of one
nation-state could pose significant security, economic and other threats to the global order. 85

85
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CHAPTER II
THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING VIABLE STATES IN FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES
“Bazzars are a major social and commercial institution throughout the Mideast.
But it remains my conviction that their time is past…The bazaaris are a fanatic
lot, highly resistant to change because their locations afford a lucrative monopoly.
I could not stop building supermarkets. I wanted a modern country. Moving
against the bazaars was typical of the political and social risks I had to take in my
drive for modernization.” M. Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s former Shah.86
Introduction
The former Shah of Iran’s words elucidate the difficulties many non-Western nations
have faced in strengthening state institutions and modernizing their societies. To gain a better
understanding of the challenges facing the state in countries such as Afghanistan, this chapter
will focus on state-society relations and their impact on state building. The chapter’s emphasis
will be placed on the distribution of social control and its significance for building a viable state
in highly tribal, fragmented states. As Migdal points out, “The ineffectiveness of leaders who
have faced impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the
societies they have confronted.”87
This discussion will also include theories that provide social, cultural, and transnational
explanations for the failure of many weak states to establish viable state institutions. Such states,
while stronger, are only one among many organizations that competes for social control. This
underscores the point that when society is fragmented, the state will face significant challenges
in mobilizing it to support state goals or representing a single national interest. As Ibn Khaldun
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points out, “A dynasty rarely established itself firmly in the hands with many different tribes and
groups.” 88
Mobilization and Social Control
The backdrop for state aggressiveness has been the special character of the world system
during the last half millennium. The state’s ability to survive has depended on a number of
factors including its organizational capabilities, the size of its population, its potential material
and human capital and its place in the larger international configuration. Understanding the
differences in state capabilities requires more than a simple definition of the state as a political
organization that forms the basis for government in a given territory.89 Migdal argues that
differences among states have related to variations in certain attributes of “stateness”, forming
the driving force behind political leaders’ goals. This has included the state’s desire to maintain
its monopoly on the use of force, ensure its own predominance in relation to other social actors
in society, and aim for significant differentiation of its components through the use of numerous
agencies that take on the specialized, complex tasks of governing the details of people’s lives.90
To assume that states in all times and places have had a similar ability or potential to
achieve their goals is akin to taking the institution of the nation-state for granted and losing sight
of the varying roles that states have played in different societies, a point largely neglected by
Realism. As the role of the state was changing during the seventeenth century in Europe, John
Locke and Thomas Hobbes made clear distinctions between the state and other components in
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society.91 92 Hence, political leaders have faced persistent and significant obstacles in their drive
to achieve their goals while not many of them have overcome the formidable challenges they
faced.

The state’s ability to neutralize or eliminate opposition against its predominance,

encompassing the supply and authorization of the written and unwritten rules meant to dictate
daily behavior in society and provide governance has varied markedly. As Migdal asserts, “Some
states have gained much more mastery than others in governing, who may heal the sick and who
may not; the duration, content , and quality of children’s education; numerous specification of
house one many build for oneself, with whom one may or may not have sexual relations; and
countless other details of human actions and relationships.”93
The ability to mobilize the population is of high importance for states as it affords them
the opportunity to channel the population into specialized organizational frameworks and
strengthen state structures. This allows state leaders to build stronger armies, collect more taxes
and pursue the state’s other interests. However, state capabilities required for mobilizing the
population to solicit support for state goals have varied greatly, particularly if they’ve faced
challenges. As Migdal points out states’ ability to mobilize their population has been crucial in
marshaling strength for the state.94 “The foundation of power in the global system is the
relationship between state and society. Governments acquire tools of political influence through
the mobilization of human and material resources or state action”, Kugler and

omke add.95
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could grow out of social control, the new ability to have people follow state rules. Mobilizing the
population to pay taxes has been of particular importance in creating viable nation-states.
Expanded taxation has been a major contributor to strengthening the capacity of state
institutions, particularly the military and judiciary arms of the state.96 Getting the population to
obey the rules of the state rather than the rules of the local powerbrokers such as clan and tribe
grew “much less from lofty visions of universal justice and what the society should be than from
the need for political leaders to ensure their own survival.”

97

Establishing state social control

within society is the key that could unlock the doors to increased capabilities in the international
arena, underscoring the different experiences of mostly Western nations from countries such as
Afghanistan. 98
Despite several attempts, the Afghan state failed to compel the majority of its population
to obey state rules or pay taxes as social control remained contested among many organizations
in its highly fragmented society. The contested nature of social control in Afghanistan served as
one of the main reasons for the state’s inability to establish its predominance. It therefore comes
as no surprise that the growth of the very first modern nation-state in Europe included the
composition of a triad of important state tentacles such as a standing army, a vastly improved
tax-collecting mechanism, and an expanded set of judicial errors. In particular, the
implementation of the state law in lieu of fragmented customary or feudal law through the
extension of the court system was vital in persuading people to behave as state leaders wanted
them to behave and not according to the orders of tribal chieftains and local powerbrokers,
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common in Afghanistan. In European states, the courts and the security apparatus that included
policing also played a crucial role in shifting social control to the state. Such mobilization
provided the human and material capability to fight for survival among political entities that
were competing for domination, leading to political entities of unimaginable strength. 99 100
State Capacity and Crises
To ensure continuity and survival, the state must be capable of confronting crises. Weak
states such as Afghanistan are particularly vulnerable to crises. The challenges facing the state
ought to be scattered so that they do not exceed its capabilities. As LaPalombara and Weiner
point out, at any one point the government is capable of handling only a limited “load” of
problems, demands, and conflicts if the state is to main itself at a particular level of
institutionalization, stability and effectiveness.101
When challenges confronting the state exceed its capabilities, state’s legitimacy will be
easily impaired, necessitating its use of force in order to maintain itself. This phenomenon is
particularly relevant in weak states such as Afghanistan when state capabilities are severely
limited without much structural support.

As the fragmentation of the Afghan state will

demonstrate, exceeding state capabilities will lead to increasingly severe negative sanctions,
resulting in the use of excessive force and chipping away at state’s legitimacy. This will set the
stage for heightened conflict between state and society. 102 103
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In contrast to Afghanistan’s rudimentary and frail state institutions, institutionalized or
strong states can count on their well-established and venerable organizations to weather crises
and successfully mobilize their populations to supporting state goals. As Huntington points out,
with increasing longevity institutions become more adaptable to successfully face new
challenges and display more flexibility in accommodating change.

For example, calls for

political competition and electoral participation may be met with less resistance if the state is
institutionalized or as the case of Afghanistan illustrates, weak institutions are vulnerable to
failure when faced with significant socio-political challenges.

Nordlinger notes that state

institutionalization before facing crises might provide “the political elite with sufficient sense of
security for it to accommodate itself to these changes in a peaceful manner.” 104
In contrast, in Afghanistan where incumbents were insecure and state institutions were
fragile, any claims for social or political reforms would be adamantly rejected, leading to state
repression.

The state’s alienated posture would hinder future cooperation and result in

heightened conflict between state and society.105 The Afghan state’s overly aggressive and
repressive posture in the late 1970s and 1980s led to a worsening relationship between the state
and society, resulting in a complete breakdown by the early 1990s.
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This jeopardized any

chance of future social or political cooperation among the warring sides and producing over two
decades of conflict. 107
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State-Society Relations: Fragmentation of Authority
As the case of Afghanistan during the communist era will elucidate, not all states that
have adopted ambitious goals and sought predominance through the creation of massive state
institutions, have yielded similar results.108 The state in many developing nations has faced
strong opposition in effecting intended changes, highlighting the need for a close review of the
sources of resistance to the state efforts. The sources of resistance can be explained through
Migdal’s model that depicts society as a mélange of social organizations, rather the dichotomous
structure that practically all past models of macro-level change have used, such as centerperiphery, or modern traditional. “The image of a mélange conveys two facets of the model.
First, the groups exercising social control in a society may be heterogeneous both in their form
and in the rules they apply. Second, the distributions of social control in the society may be
among numerous, fairly autonomous groups rather than concentrated largely in the state”109,
Migdal asserts. In other words, he suggests that the overall sum of authority may be quite high
in society; however, exercising of that authority may be fragmented. This mélange depicts the
state as only one organization among many. These organizations including states, ethnic groups,
the institutions of particular social classes, villages, and any others enforcing rules of the game,
have offered individuals the components for survival strategies.110
Although in some instances, the state might make and enforce nearly all rules in society
as it happens in totalitarian states; it can opt to delegate some of its authority to other
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mechanisms such as the church or the market, as is the case in liberal democratic states. 111 Rules
and norms as well as dominant organizations have offered the cues to individuals on how to
conduct themselves in order to either maintain or advance their status. In contrast, state and
society in Afghanistan have been in conflict and proposed different sets of rules on fundamental
questions as to what is proper human behavior and how the society should be constituted. 112 113
114

This is a clear indication that that the mélange of social organizations have been marked by

environments of conflict, denoting an active struggle for social control among many
organizations.
Environments of Conflict and the Authority to Make Rules
In environments of conflict, individuals must choose between competing components in
making their strategies of survival, difficult choices for people who face the possibility of
competing sanctions.115 For example, the Afghan state in the 1980s and 1990s succumbed to
becoming a part of an environment of conflict that was dominated by tribal chiefs, warlords and
strongmen.

This predicament has not been limited to Afghanistan but has also affected other

developing nations.

A Senegalese minister depicts the conflict among organizations with

different rules of the game in the following manner: “The clan is a Sengales evil, which has been
with us for long generations, constantly denounced by the party, but always increasing in
strength…. in passionate confrontation, occasionally armed struggle, between clans that are not
111
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sanctioned by the state and operate under rules that are different from those put forward by the
state.116 In many weak states such as Senegal and Afghanistan, political leaders have not
achieved predominance for their states through the ability “to fashion rules and to have those
rules broadly accepted, but these state leaders have accepted the foal that they should be
predominant.”

117

In Afghanistan, the Soviet-backed state’s struggle with society, among other

things, was with families over the rules of education and socialization, and with religious groups
over who sanctifies sexual unions or with ethnic groups over questions of authority and
territoriality.118 119
As Mustafa Kemal Attaturk’s confrontation with the religious establishment over banning
of traditional Turkish hats suggests, the issue was not as inconsequential as it might first appear.
The conflict was over who had the right and the ability to make rules in society. The model of
society as a mélange places such issues in the context of an existing environment of conflict.
More importantly, such examples suggest that perhaps because the state’s role in making and
enforcing rules about public affairs and certain intimacies of private life is largely taken for
granted in Western societies, many social scientists have lost sight of the conflict and struggles in
societies with relatively new or conflicted states.

Many experts including anthropologists

haven’t paid sufficient attention to conflict among organizations offering different rules. The
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major struggles in conflicted states such as Afghanistan have been over who has the right and
ability to make the countless rules that govern and guide people’s social behavior.120
Non-compliance in such states, however, does not necessarily indicate personal deviance
or criminal behavior but rather a more fundamental conflict over which organizations in society,
the state or others, ought to make and implement the laws. In essence, these struggles reflect the
disagreements over whether the state is able to displace or harness other organizations, families,
clans, tribes and other entities that make rules contradicting the wishes and objective of state
leaders. Migdal asserts, “In many societies, state officials have simply not gained the rights and
ability to make many rules they would like. Families and clans may seek to marry off children at
ages quite different from the minimum age of marriage set by state law.

Landlords and

shopkeepers may seek interest rates for loans at variance with those legislated by the state.”121
Web-Like Societies and Social Structure
The struggle over the state’s desire for predominance, the accommodations between the
state and others, as well as the maneuvers to gain the best possible deal in such an arrangement
constitutes the real politics of many weak states including Afghanistan. State leaders’ drive for
dominance and their quest for uncontested social control have stalled in many countries due to
the tenacious and resilient nature of the organizations scattered throughout their societies.122
Social control is regarded as the currency over which organizations in an environment of conflict
battle one another. High levels of social control allows states to mobilize their populations,
skimming surpluses effectively from their societies and adding to the strength of the state in
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facing external threats.

Strength of state organizations in conflicted environments such as

Afghanistan has been largely dependent on the ability of the state to exercise social control. The
more currency the state possesses-that is, compliance, participation and legitimation-available to
state leaders, the higher the level of social control to achieve state goals. State’s ability to
exercise social control will also allow state personnel to gain autonomy from other social groups
in determining their own preferences for what ought to be the rules of the society.123
The capacity of the state and in particular its ability to implement social policies and
mobilize its public is directly related to the structure of its society as illustrated by Afghanistan.
As Migdal points out, “The ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers
to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies they have confronted, from
the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders, and other strongmen
through various social organizations,”124
More importantly, there can be no understanding of the capabilities of weak states
without first understanding their social structure. In such countries the state has faced the
greatest obstacles in its drive for predominance because there is a prevalence of a social
environment in which many structures conflict with one another over how social life should be
ordered. Nevertheless, while the state may still constitute the most prominent organization; its
leaders have failed to establish its predominance, enabling it to govern the details of most of its
citizens’ lives in the society. 125
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In fragmented societies such as Afghanistan, the strength of shared memories and beliefs
within various subunits such as clans, tribes, linguistic and ethnic groups suggest an image for
societies in some developing countries that is different from the centralized structures found in
European countries.126

As Migdal notes, “Numerous Third World societies have been as

resilient as the intricate spiders’ web; one could snip a corner of the web away and the rest of the
web would swing majestically between the branches, just as one could snip centre strands and
have the web continue to exist.”
The difficulties state leaders have faced in some developing nations to achieve social
control relates to the state’s place in the web-like societies as they host a mélange of fairly
autonomous social organizations reflecting the fractionalization between less developed nations
and elsewhere.127 According to Salame, the concept of modern nation-state opposes other
structures such as tribalism, adding to the difficult interplay between state and a tribal society
during the different phases of state formation.128
Fragmentation of Social Control
A key element of society’s strength is centered on the distribution and centralization of
social control. Weak states have generally differed from other states not so much in the amount
of social control in the society but its distribution and centralization.129 Migdal regards the
highly centralized and the more diffused as “strong” type of societies because the overall level of
social control is high.
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concentrates social control at the apex of the pyramid, in the state, while the other social control
is spread through various fairly autonomous social organizations.”

e argues that both types

differ from “weak” societies where the overall level of social control is low as the latter have
appeared “in the wake of cataclysmic events”. Since natural disasters and wars greatly decrease
the overall level of social control in the society by taking away rewards and sanctions from the
hands of social organizations’ leaders or by making irrelevant the strategies of survival they
offer.130 Lee adds, “The assumption of increasing roles and activities by the peripheral state
makes it increasingly the prime target of expectations and demands by popular classes directed
towards the state.” 131
In Afghanistan where social control is highly fragmented, the society’s influence on the
state is more visible. Afghan leaders have historically had a very limited reservoir of structural
support because a significant level of social control remained with tribal and ethnic leaders; state
leaders have found it difficult to check the centrifugal forces that grow as a select few agencies
might flourish.132 As Migdal points out, “In countries where a very few agencies have an
oligopoly on mobilizational capabilities, the position of state leaders may be precarious indeed.
Thus, as long as strongmen continue to offer viable strategies for survival to those of their
villages, ethnic groups, urban neighborhoods, and so on, states can marshal only limited public
support since there is little motivation for the population to lend such support.” 133 It is worth
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noting that in addition to the presence of tribal leaders and strongmen, the Afghan state’s main
difficulty has been overcoming or displacing the pattern of fragmented social control that
operates with different rules of the game.134
Migdal cautions, however, that strong societies such as those found in Afghanistan are
“not putty to be modeled by states with sufficient technical resources, managerial abilities and
committed personnel.”

e adds, “Although the set of organizations ranging from small kinship

groups to large tribes and ethnic groups are thought as anachronistic as the hand plow, it has
often not simply disintegrated under the impact of state policies or even in the wake of increased
urbanization and urbanization. The tenacity of these groups and their strongmen leaders can
enrage determined state official.”135
National Identity and State Formation
To maximize the probabilities of developing a political system in a non-violent, nonauthoritarian form, strengthen the state and achieve stability in historically fragmented societies
such as Afghanistan, a certain sense of national identity should precede the institutionalization of
the state. As Nordlinger points out when a state is confronted with conflicts, the best way to
ensure its survival and avoid violent conflict with societal groups is to have institutionalized a
firmly structured, effective and powerful government.

136

Such a government, however, could

find itself in a much stronger position to achieve state goals after questions surrounding national
identity have been addressed. Nordlinger claims, “Without a subjective identification with the
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regime on the part of the political actors, not only will the government have difficulty in
applying its decisions, and thus maintaining its authority, but all types of change will remain in
abeyance until a national identity is formed.”137
This is particularly relevant to Afghanistan where the strength of communal loyalties and
ethnic factionalism prevented the consolidation of a national identity before the formation of a
central government. The lack of a strong national identity has prevented many Afghans to feel
uneasy about being ruled by men of other tribes or ethnicities as their submission would not only
signal their vulnerability to oppression but also degradation.

138

The dilapidation of the Afghan

state illustrates that the absence of a strong national identity before institutionalization could
severely weaken the state and exacerbate resentment toward incumbent groups, deepening the
divide between state and society. As Nordlinger asserts, “The government acts by itself and for
itself…, government becomes the highroad for personal advancement and the furtherance of
narrowly conceived group interests and in this sense government may be characterized as
parasitic and corrupting.” 139
A rapidly created national identity in divided societies, however, will not act as an
integrative force, and would at best serve as a “thin veneer” covering the cracks in “the cultural
plaster.” 140 Feelings of oppression and degradation can only be compounded during the process
of institutionalization since the process will underscore the presence and predominance of the
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incumbents as perceived by rival communities. According to Nordlinger, the more common
sequence is either the emergence of national identity after the central government has been
institutionalized or the simultaneous development of both the central government and national
identity. Given its significant importance, a national identity should be formed as soon as
possible once a government has been created so that it could alleviate the strains and conflicts
that hinder the peaceful development of a non-authoritarian and democratic government.141
Although in the 1960s national integration as related to nation-building strategies was
considered to be the prevailing issue for many countries in the Middle East, including
Afghanistan, recent events have prompted many scholars to reexamine the causes for the
disintegration or inherent weaknesses of the existing nation-states in non-Western countries.
Salame argues that urban elites in the Arab world have not been successful to cope with the
developments of the post-Ottoman era, and have thereby unwittingly set the stage for the
ascendance of tribal and rural groups to power: “While most parts of the urban body politic have
lost ground…some rural groups, hitherto denied political participation, have been able to intrude
into the modern state and to step up in the social hierarchy and also to enforce their political
positions. Finally, they were able to capture the state.”

e adds, “The armies have been the

swords in the hand of the rural population …Rural elements gradually became urban and
reversely the state power became rural. The development of the modern state and its institutions
were overladen with the henceforth emerging asabiyyas.”142 143
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The feature that characterizes the discourse in the Middle East, according to Salame, is
that many countries’ leaders are imprisoned in their ideology of the modern nation-state,
compelling them to obscure their origin. 144
Inherent Constraints to State-Building
Cultural and Religious
Afghanistan as a Muslim, culturally diverse, and tribal nation has to a certain extent faced
similar challenges as many other Middle Eastern countries in building state capacities. It is
therefore pertinent to examine some of the factors that have inhibited the building of viable states
in much of the Middle East compared to mostly Western nations. According to Ayubi, there are
several interconnected factors that drastically limit the Arab state’s capacity for social control.
The first pertains to vested interests against political or economic liberalization. The second
consists of cultural dispositions favorable to authoritarianism. And the third involves inhibitions
against reforms liable to fuel uncontrollable and self-augmenting demands for redistribution. It’s
noted that culture reflects much more than economics and is difficult to change by considering
cultural barriers to economic liberalization in a state.145
The main hurdle to economic liberalization, Ayubi suggests, is the long-standing
weakness of private property rights. In much of the Arab world, private property never
developed the legitimacy that it acquired in the West, partly because successive rulers reallocated
agricultural estates to prevent the emergence of hereditary landed class and partly because wealth
and status were traditionally derived from closeness to political power rather than from economic
productivity. Hence, one of the initial reforms proposed by the Soviet-backed regime in
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Afghanistan was the redistribution of land that was meant to weaken the landed elites and tribal
structures. Additionally, the main obstacle to political liberalization is the dominant approach to
liberty in traditional Islamic thought. Historically, Ayubi explains, liberty has carried mainly a
“psychological and metaphysical” meaning in Islamic discourse, rather than a “political and
social” one as is common in Western societies.146 This point is probably epitomized by the
puritanical rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan discussed in the following chapter.

The

consequence of such cultural legacies is the prevailing historical weakness of the demand for
political and economic liberties in some Middle Eastern countries. Ayubi claims that in every
known society, individuals cry foul when their own property is confiscated, and they resent state
controls on their personal economic activities. However, such individuals are generally less
inclined to vigorously demand a liberal order based on free enterprise, limited government, and
the rule of law. 147
Both Pan-Arab and Islamist movements have undervalued the issue of the state and have
tended to regard matters of borders, populations, rights and other as rather artificial or superficial
details, weakening the concept of nation-state predominantly non-Western societies.148 As the
Taliban rule in Afghanistan demonstrates, while the regime used the state’s security apparatus to
enforce its own version of religious morals by creating a ministry for promotion of virtue and
prevention of vice, it did not bother with other aspects of what constitutes a state such as
governance.149 As Ayubi points out, “Islamic thinkers were in no hurry to espouse this new
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concept of the state and Afghani and Abduh were still speaking of the Islamic Ummah or nation,
its tight bond and of the Islamic ruler and his good conduct.”150 Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi
suggests that an Islamic league can serve as a bond among Muslims. He uses the term Ummah
not only as a religious connotation but also as an ethnic one, al-watan or homeland is used when
discussing the bonds that unite the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the Middle East.
While states the Middle East have been concerned since the nineteenth century with the
manifestations of power, they seem to have paid little attention to its social, economic and
intellectual foundations within the state. 151
Ideological and Structural
More importantly, though non-Western countries were quick to embrace and adopt the
structural features of the state and bureaucracy, they were rather sluggish in internalizing the
concept of the state itself. According to Ayubi, the Arab state has been slow to embrace “the
ethics of the public service and the attitudes of collective action, nor were they impressed by the
concept of freedom, a concept Western scholars link closely to the development of the modern
nation-state.”152 Al-Arawi contends that the state in the Middle East is all body and muscle but
with little spirit and mind and with no theory of liberty while Laroui adds that the Arab state is
“obsessed with power and strength” and though it may be strong in terms of its “body”, its
violence is an indication of its fragility because as a whole the state lacks rationality and the
necessary moral and ideological support. 153
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The root causes of this phenomenon can be mainly attributed to the fact that the Arab
state has not been associated during its emergence and development with the notion of liberty in
its

Western

sense.

According

to

Laroui,

“Liberty

in

Islamic

thought

has

a

psychological/methaphysical meaning whereas in Western thought it carries mainly a political
and social meaning. Western liberal thought links the concept of liberty to the concept of law
and therefore to the state, the signs and symbols of freedom in Islamic society are usually extrastatal or anti-statal, e.g. nomadism, tribalism, Sufism.”

154

He adds that there is “mutual

exclusivity between the concept of liberty and the concept of the state in traditional AraboIslamic society; the more extended the concept of the state, the narrower the scope for
freedom.”155
Ayubi goes on to argue that tribalism in the Middle East became “politically consolidated
and consecrated and in some cases invented after the Islamic conquest of new lands, due to the
way the troops were recruited, housed and remunerated via the donations register established by
Umar ibn al-Khattab.”

156

He stresses, however, that for a long time the tribe has represented an

alternative to the modern state and that it would be mistaken to define the tribe by only its
opposition to the state since some tribes may be indeed “interested” in the state allowing for
“political tribalism” to exist. This is illustrated by the delicate balance of power manifested
through accommodation between the Afghan state and its tribes preceding the 1978 revolution.
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Nevertheless, as the Afghan conflict from 1978 to 2001 has elucidated any such collaboration
between the state and the tribes very much depends on the specific historical conjunctures. 157
Transnational
Transnational political and economic forces have also affected state building efforts in
many developing countries during the second half of the twentieth century. The state in capitalist
societies is dependent upon private accumulation whereas in peripheral societies, the state is
dependent additionally upon transnational political and economic forces such as geopolitical
concerns.158 The creation of the Afghan state to serve as a buffer by the British colonial power
and the state’s continued reliance upon the financial and material support of world powers to
remain relatively functional is a clear example of this phenomenon. As Lee asserts, “The simple
historical fact that nearly all peripheral societies today have a colonial past is most telling of the
points made. As these areas were incorporated in to the expanding capitalist world economy, the
colonial states were created as mechanisms that operated to impose capitalist relationships and
imperial controls originating from the core of the world economy.
Certainly, individual peripheral states differed from one another in their experience with
colonialism.

At issue is the impact of world capitalism on the state in the periphery as this

influence did not wither away during periods of decolonization.159 The peripheral state could not
disengage from prior transnational linkages in the post-colonial era since in countries such as
Afghanistan where the state apparatus was implanted, geopolitical concerns played a critical role.
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Lee’s findings suggest that except in a few isolated instances, transnational factors pose
significant determinants of the expansion of the relative power of the nation-state in relation to
the society.

e asserts, “The degree to which a peripheral economy is open to the capitalist

world-economy through trade of commodities and the competitive linkage of a peripheral state to
the inter-state system were each found to the principle of and significant determinant of both the
peripheral state’s extractive capacity and its military activities.” 160
Lee’s findings also suggest that some peripheral states during recent decades have
bolstered their relative power in relation to their societies mainly due to their structural relations
with the outside world. He adds that the state as the gatekeeper of relations with the outside
world has found its locus of power mainly in that role. He concedes, however, that the power of
the peripheral state is limited when it concerns dealing with transnational corporations and core
states because of the constraints imposed on it by international structures.161
Conclusion
The discrepancy in states’ ability to achieve social control demands an appreciation of the
multitude of different social, cultural, historical and economic challenges that face the state.
While there is nothing inexorable about the shift to state predominance in Western nations, as
this chapter has demonstrated, the state in many fragmented societies functions as only one
organization among many in a mélange within the boundaries in which it seeks to rule. As
Migdal points out, “In many cases, web-like societies have survived with social control dispersed
among various social organizations having their own rules rather than centralized in the state or
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organizations authorized by the state.”162 In particular, as Afghanistan illustrates, a prolonged
environment of conflict places the state at loggerheads with tribal, ethnic, and other groups in
society with each one struggling to establish the currency of social control because leaders regard
it to offer them the means for survival.
The continued weakness of many non-Western states despite the resources and agencies
at their disposal appears to also lie around the dilemma of state leaders. In the wake of continued
fragmentation of social control, leaders pursue politics of survival, preventing state institutions
from bolstering their capabilities.

These leaders hinder the development of multifaceted

organizations within state institutions, mainly because they seek to balance powerful institutions
against one another.163 As the case of Afghanistan and other fragile states clearly elucidates the
politics of survival at the apex of weak states has tremendously diminished the coherence of the
state and undermined its relationship with society.164
It’s important to note, however, that a hard state does not equal a strong state. While one
punishes and coerces, the other achieves its goals. Based on Ayubi’s definition, all Arab states as
of recently were hard states, and a few, such as Syria and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, used to be
ultra-hard or fierce, employing vast bureaucracies, large armies, and harsh prisons. However,
these hard states were also weak states as evidenced by their demise in the wake of Arab Spring
because they lacked the capacity to enforce laws, break traditional patterns, and adapt to
changing conditions.

They relied on violence insofar as they could not accomplish their

objectives through persuasion and economic incentives.
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Social, cultural, religious and transnational factors have had an enormous influence on
the formation and institutionalization of the state in non-Western nations such as Afghanistan.
The disparity in the development and capacity of states lends credence to those who contend that
while the introduction of the nation-state model has yielded success in some parts of the world; it
has exacerbated tensions in fragmented societies like Afghanistan, where both state and society
vie for social control. This underscores Ayubi’s contention that the concept of “state” has
mainly come to the Middle East as an “imported commodity, partly under colonial pressure and
partly
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imitation

and

mimicry.”165

CHAPTER III
SOCIO-POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF STATE
FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN
(1978-2001)
Introduction
This chapter will provide a historical background of the state in Afghanistan to chronicle
the struggle between modernizers and traditionalists, and to illustrate dilapidation of the state in
the wake of deepening socio-political fragmentation. This chapter will provide a comparative
analysis of state decay under different governments from 1978 to 2001 by assessing their ability
to provide essential governance such as population security, healthcare and access to education.
Afghanistan’s integration into the system of nation-states was in large part essential as it
was expected to serve as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. The state
system’s formation was accompanied by the creation of contending forces. The Afghan state
during the colonial era was intended to block Russian advances toward British India, prompting
the British to support the formation of a nation-state system in Afghanistan with a predominance
of coercive resources. Although, isolated from the international capitalist market and relatively
successful in resisting direct rule by the colonial powers, Afghanistan eventually joined the
system of nation-states. The Mohammadzai dynastic centralized state was established during the
last two decades of the nineteenth century by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan. The strong Amir
initiated a state policy aimed at disarming and militarily overwhelming all existing forms of
autonomous communities in order to establish the predominance of state.1
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The Amir was successful in this endeavor, in large part thanks to generous funding by the
British. Although, the Amir managed to drastically change the balance of power between
autonomous local communities and the state in favor of a more powerful, emergent modern state,
attempts to sustain and consolidate this predominance have failed.2 Nevertheless, establishing
central government control over a tribal, independent-minded, and geographically isolated
patchwork of peoples has remained an ongoing project through much of the twentieth century.
As Chapter II demonstrated, the mixture of a diverse set of groups in many non-Western states
and the contested nature of social control complicates state building efforts. Migdal asserts,
“First, the groups exercising social control in a society many be heterogeneous both in their form
and in the rules they apply….Second, the distribution of social control in society may be among
numerous, fairly autonomous groups rather than concentrated largely in the state.

In this

mélange, the state has been one organization among many.”3
In Afghanistan’s tribal society where the population is fragmented and not integrated into
a single national society, it’s been extremely difficult for the state to represent a common
interest. Given these inherent disadvantages, the Afghan state remained weak and was able to
secure its survival and maintain peace largely thanks to preserving a delicate balance of power
with its fragmented society between 1931 and 1978. Control of the state apparatus remained
largely in the hands of unrepresentative elite.4 Although tension between a modernizing elite and
a traditional rural majority had been, and would continue to be a critical cleavage in Afghan
society, it did not lead to violent conflict and the country was continuing its slow trajectory of
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political and economic reforms until late 1970s. Nevertheless, the enormous gulf between
Afghanistan’s urban elite and its traditional majority led to political upheaval, a series of coups,
and the 1979 Soviet intervention. 5 6
The Soviet intervention and support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a new
modernizing force in 1979, galvanized a rural resistance movement that morphed into a series of
groups known as the Mujahedin or Islamic fighters. The Mujahedin waged a ten year war
against the Soviet-backed regime eventually forcing its collapse. The collapse of the regime in
1992 left Afghanistan with an interim government consisting of Mujahedin parties and former
government militias. Given Mujahedin groups’ longstanding rivalries, exacerbated in large part
by ethnic and tribal differences, and their thirst for power led to a deepening of socio-political
fragmentation, ultimately paving the way for the disintegration of the state. 7 8
Although, the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (1978-1992) attempted
to assert the state’s dominance over society and provided some public goods, its successor, the
Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992-1996) was embroiled in violent conflict where state authority
was severely undermined and challenged by a multitude of armed groups. The capabilities of an
already weak state were further diminished as it suffered from a lack of functioning government
institutions, police units, and judiciary. The state under the Mujahedin rule was characterized by
conflict and a vacuum of authority.
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5

Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin Wermester, Nation-Building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in
Afghanistan (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 43.
6

Ghani, “Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan.”

7

William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (Houndmills, Basingstoke, ampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002), 283.
8

Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 486–488.

52

(1996-2001), marked the birth of traditional yet deeply religious state that ran counter to the
nation-state model. The Taliban government while establishing its monopoly on the use of force
presided over a dilapidated government bureaucracy that possessed little to no means or capacity
to provide public goods. Although the state under the Taliban rule lacked professional governing
mechanisms and security apparatus, the Taliban consolidated their rule by enforcing strict
religious rule and imposing severe punishments on those who opposed them.10
The Origins of the Nation-State Model in Afghanistan
Modernization Drive and Societal Backlash
The modernization of the Afghan state began with the decade-long reign of King
Amanullah Khan (1919-1929). Amanullah Khan’s long term vision for Afghanistan centered on
transforming Afghanistan into a centralized, secular state, gradually reforming its conservative,
atomized tribal society. During one of his early speeches in 1919, the king spoke of his intention
to create a modern Afghanistan that would take “take its proper place among the civilized
powers of the world.”

e envisioned a unitary state structure with a modern civil service that

bypassed the leaders of local tribes. This central bureaucracy would also directly govern the
countryside, administer security, justice, taxation, and social programs based on laws passed by a
national Afghan parliament and approved by the King as a constitutional monarch. His reforms
also included the equality of men and women before the law and removal of women from being
subjected to veil restrictions, giving them the right to marry a man of their choice. It was during
King Amanullah’s reign that Afghanistan gained its independence from Britain in 1919. While
9
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brandishing a sword, the King announced during a public gathering: “I have declared myself and
my country entirely free, autonomous and independent both internally and externally. My
country will hereafter be as independent a state as the other states and powers of the world are.
No foreign power will be allowed to have a hairs-breadth of right to interfere internally or
externally with the affairs of the Afghanistan, and if any ever does I am ready and prepared to
cut its throat with this sword.”11
King Amanullah’s reform program included the establishment of a European-style
Council of Ministers, and with the help of French and Turkish advisors he prepared
Afghanistan’s first constitution enshrining Afghans’ basic rights that included equal status for
women. He expanded the national army and undercut the tribal chiefs’ sway over the center by
using conscription. King Amanuallah also established a new Ministry of Education that presided
over all government schools and opened more secular schools to train the state’s future
generation of technocrats. By 1928, to the dismay of many mullahs, the Afghan state had
enrolled over 40000 students in government-run schools, and many graduates were receiving
scholarships to go abroad for higher education. 12
While Amanullah’s reforms enjoyed domestic and external support, his reforms modeled
upon Ataturk’s reforms in Turkey and aimed at westernization of the population including the
removal of veil for women and beard for men, triggered a backlash by the clergy and
conservative tribal chiefs across the country eventually leading to his downfall and exile to
Rome.13 This marked a significant backlash by traditional forces against state efforts for
predominance in Afghanistan’s contemporary history.
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The Era of Relative Peace and Stability
After a brief period of turmoil, Nadir Shah ascended to the throne.

Nadir Shah’s

Musahiban Dynasty ushered in a half century of peace and nation building in Afghanistan.
Many historians have termed Nadir Shah’s reign as “Era of Tranquility” in contemporary Afghan
history. This relative peace was made possible through an accommodation between state and
society. The Afghan state and tribal religious power brokers reached an accommodation. While
the Musahibans occupied the pinnacle of the triangle, they respected the domain of the tribal and
religious leaders.14
Beginning in 1929 the dynasty embarked on a nation-building drive unprecedented in
Afghan history, lasting forty nine years. Nadir Shah’s authoritative character and his emphasis
on co-opting rather than confronting the tribal and religious leaders set the tone for a stable
Musahiban rule. Moreover, his reputation as a strong military commander and war hero during
Afghanistan’s War of Independence against the British helped him consolidate his grip on
power. Nadir Shah set out with grants from the British to set up a new army and sought loans
and technical advice from European nations and Japan to spur economic growth while promoting
laissez-faire economics. Exports of Afghan fruits and textiles steadily rose during the 1930s.
The regime with Germany’s assistance built power-plants that significantly upgraded the supply
of electricity to Kabul’s homes, business, and government offices. Germany and Italy also
provided consulting services to the Afghan state to develop an interlocking system of statecontrolled banks, holding companies, and factories based on the Italian model. The central bank
of the state invested public and private deposits in both private and state-controlled enterprises.
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Gradual Reforms through Accommodation
More importantly, the Musahiban

ynasty abandoned Amanullah Khan’s quest to

transform Afghanistan’s tribes with an “encapsulation” strategy and opted to engage them
through co-opting, mutual respect and communication, essentially accepting the decentralized
form of state authority. In return for financial assistance and development projects from the
center, tribal leaders were expected to maintain stability. Nadir Shah’s new army and air force
made steady progress and grew both in size and capability. The regime did not tolerate any
disturbances to public peace and warned that the government would not hesitate to suppress,
“signs of unrest and rebellion, tending to the disturbance of public peace.” The government also
made sure the constitution was crafted in a way to make sure the cohabitation of secular civil law
administered by civil officials; customary law based on local tribal codes and Pashtunwali, and
religious law applied by qazis or judges. These three streams of law were later recognized in the
constitution during the reign of Nadir Shah’s son, King Zahir Shah, who became king in 1933
following Nadir’s Shah’s assassination.15
During the Musahiban Dynasty, educational initiatives were among the more successful
programs sponsored by the US and the West. Over 2000 Afghan students and educators were
awarded scholarships to study in the United States, and over one hundred foreign professors
taught at Kabul University’s campuses. The US Federal Aviation Administration funded a 49
percent stake in Afghanistan’s national airline, training its pilots and staff and expanding its fleet.
The United States also funded the $50 million Helmand River project designed to resuscitate the
once-fertile lower Helmand River Valley. Foreign aid mostly from the United State and the
Soviet Union stimulated expansion of the state and produced new relations between the state and
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the society. Zahir Shah, in response to the pressures of the newly educated class, promulgated a
new constitution with an elected, consultative parliament in 1964 which produced nearly a
decade of constitutional rule known as “New emocracy” under which the government held two
elections.16
In 1973, however, Zahir Shah was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his cousin Daud
Khan who declared Afghanistan a republic. This marked the first time the government of
Afghanistan was overthrown by professional army officers as opposed to rural-based tribal
uprisings.17

uring

aud Khan’s rule as president, the state benefited from an oil boom. Daud

used these funds to continue his state building strategy, making the state more independent of the
tribes. According to Rubin, “Between 1956 and 1978, an estimated 3800 Afghan military
officers –concentrated in the elite air force and armored corps-had been trained in the Soviet
Union, some for as long as six years, while Afghan officers had taken a total of 487 courses in
the United States.”

18

The Afghan state’s fiscal position was strengthened by higher revenues

from natural gas and from foreign exchange derived from remittances sent back by Afghans
working in the Gulf. The Shah of Iran also opened negotiations for extensive economic
development with Daud, as part of his grandiose scheme to reconstitute the Persian Empire.
Most of this money was meant to build Afghanistan’s first railroad connecting its main cities to
the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. By 1977, the state’s expanding bureaucracy was funded
largely with revenue from sale of natural gas, foreign aid and a smaller portion of tax revenues.19
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Thanks to gender reforms implemented during the rule of King Zahir Shah and President
Daud Khan, by the early 1960s, Kabul University and secular primary schools had become
coeducational and by 1978, women were all represented among Afghanistan’s teachers. Women
also worked side by side with men in government offices and hospitals. The cabinet included
women ministers and four women were elected to the parliament. However, for Afghan leftists
and modernizers, Afghanistan’s gradual, yet steady trajectory toward social and economic
progress was not adequate. They decided to stage a coup in 1978 that led to the killing of
President Daud Khan and his entire family. The period that followed put an end to decades of
relative peace and stability as the new rulers were bent on establishing the state’s predominance
over society.20 As Tomsen points out, “The Afghan state had existed in relative peace for a half
century before the communist coup.”21 Soviet Intervention in support of the regime lasted well
over a decade and continued until 1991 paving the way for Mujahedin rebels to assume power.
Mujahedin’s rule from 1991 to 1996 was marked by factionalism and infighting giving rise to the
Taliban movement that occupied the seat of government in 1996 and held on to power until its
ouster in 2001.
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (1978-1992): Redefining State-Society Relations
“In its domestic policy the People’s

emocratic Party of Afghanistan has adopted

a program of radical revolutionary socio-economic reforms to the benefit of the
working class; these reforms will help abolish any remains of feudalism and semifeudal social relations; they will provide for the building up of a society free from
exploitation, based upon the progressive ideology of the working class and
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scientifically-grounded socialism” Afghan President Taraki after assuming power
in 1978.22
The State Asserts Itself
The People’s

emocratic Party of Afghanistan (P PA) was one of the main groups

among the intelligentsia that succeeded in assuming political power through a coup against
President Daud in 1978.

The party enjoyed public support among those who regarded

themselves as modernizers. These modernizers advocated an overhaul of the country’s political
and social systems and enjoyed significant support within the military where the Soviet model of
modernization enjoyed most influence.23 With PDPA firmly in power, the modernizers set out to
assert state dominance over society by abandoning previous governments’ policy of
accommodation with Afghanistan’s tribal society. In its efforts aimed at social transformation,
the government heavily relied on the former Soviet Union’s financial and military support. The
Soviets significantly increased their financial and military aid and sent military advisors to help
strengthen the new leadership in Afghanistan. In addition to open-ended economic and military
assistance, the Afghan government also received over one hundred thousand Soviet troops to
support it in its fight against armed Mujahedin groups representing in large part the traditional
and rural elements of Afghan society. It’s estimated that the intervention in Afghanistan cost the
Soviet Union about five billion dollars per year.24
Since the PDPA “revolutionaries” took power through a relatively bloodless coup in
Kabul, rather than having to endure a nationwide upheaval, they were able to inherit the state
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institutions of the old regime largely intact. The coup initially had little to no immediate impact
on local and provincial administration, the collection of taxes or other day-to-day activities of the
state. However, to facilitate social transformation and establish the predominance of state over
society, PDPA decided to construct new state institutions and reform older government organs
with Soviet aid. Afghanistan became a close ally of the Soviet Union, both politically and
economically. Afghanistan’s exports to countries of the Commission for Mutual Assistance
increased 20 percent by 1980 and the Soviet share of foreign aid rose to almost 80 percent with
other members of the Warsaw Pact countries accounting for the remainder. The number of
Soviet advisors to Afghanistan jumped from 350 to over 3000 by 1980.25
The state also relied on the sale of natural gas to pay for its increasing proportions of
expenditure. The sale of natural gas had financed 40 percent of government expenditure before
the Soviet-backed coup and accounted for 60 percent of total expenditure after the deployment of
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. For example in northern Afghanistan, the Soviet aid paid for the
extension of a railroad, repair of roads, and expansion of the Kabul airport.

Soviets also

delivered 1500 trucks to the state’s transport organization, and worked with other Eastern bloc
countries to build hydroelectric power stations, to build capacity in trade and telecommunication
sectors. The Soviets invested heavily in state industries and developed the country’s copper
mines and minerals. Rubin adds, “Government employment in factories, the bureaucracy, and
the army, as well as membership in state-sanctioned organization, also provided Afghans access
to free or subsidized distribution of commodities supplied by the USSR.”26
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The state’s educational policy transformed Afghanistan’s educational system into a
mechanism of political indoctrination and recruitment from primary school to university level
education. All textbooks contained a preface lauding the regime and stressing the regime’s
educational system was to “help train the new man.”27 The Russian language became the only
foreign language taught at all levels, replacing English, French and German. Religious education
was downgraded and a new course in political science was introduced where students learned
about Marxism-Leninism, Afghan-Soviet friendship and the history of the Communist
movement. Kabul University filled 60 percent of its vacancies with faculty from socialist
countries and numerous exchange programs were set up to send students to the Soviet Union to
study for elementary, secondary, vocational, and higher education. According to an analyst at
the US State

epartment, about two thousand “military trainees” and thousands of younger

Afghans were being sent to the USSR every year. While some of the children spent the summers
in the Soviet Union, others were sent for lengthy programs of doctoral study. The regime also
sent the children of those who’d been killed fighting as soldiers to for long-term study to the
Soviet Union. According to a former director general of the Cultural Department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, “An Afghan-Soviet agreement provided for ten thousand children a year to be
sent on this program.” 28
The state possessed a robust intelligence agency and military. Its powerful intelligence
agency known as KHAD employed more than 15000 to 30000 professional spies as well as over
100000 paid informers.29 The Afghan army consisted of 14 divisions, of these 11 were infantry
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and another three were armored, and were part of three military corps. The Afghan army had
several elite units under its command such as the 26th Airborne Battalion, 444th, 37th and 38th
Commando Brigades. The army used its Commando Brigades as mobile strike forces and later
transformed them into battalions.30 The government was the beneficiary of substantial deliveries
of tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers and other weapons such as SCUD-B missiles, with
a range of up to 175 miles. As Ewans notes, “The Afghan army probably had more armaments
than it could profitably use. The army had also to some extent been rebuilt, and numbered some
55000 men, plus a Presidential Guard of some 10000 and other paramilitary units, security police
and assorted party and other militias.”31
Given the presence of a formidable insurgency, particularly in the countryside, the army
faced difficulties in enlisting new recruits. This prompted the state to adopt a carrot-and-stick
approach that incentivized military service to help attract more recruits in its fight against the
insurgency. Each year the government was able to induce 10,000 to 18,000 recruits into the
army general amnesty was announced in 1980 for those who had deserted and in 1982 students
who served in the army, and graduated 10th grade in high school, would pass 11th and 12th
grade and be given a scholarship. People who were conscripted after the 12th grade, could, after
their military service, attend any institution of higher learning they desired. Moreover, to
encourage longer military service, soldiers were quickly promoted to higher ranks.32
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Consolidation of Power through “Revolutionary” Reforms
As one of the initial orders of business, Afghanistan’s new Soviet-backed leaders began
implementing reforms aimed at asserting state dominance and supplanting the traditional
leadership as rulers and arbiters of rural society. The government introduced its reforms by
decree of the Revolutionary Council without any attempt to consult the public. The decrees were
regarded as expansive and revolutionary, seeking to change Afghanistan socially, economically
and politically. The boldest decrees dealt with thorny issues and attempted to overhaul
Afghanistan’s social structure by introducing land reforms, setting a minimum age for marriage
and eliminating other traditional practices such as bride-price.33
In light of the state’s previous failed attempts to modernize and restructure the balance of
power in its relations with society, the regime’s proposed reforms were bound to trigger a strong
backlash from traditionalists. As Rubin asserts, “If implemented, these decrees would have
transformed Afghan rural society; the symmetrical reciprocity dominated by khans or jirgas
(tribal councils) would be replaced by a system of economically comparable nuclear families
linked through market relations and tied directly to the state.”34 He adds that these decrees were
intended to destroy the economic and social basis of exchanges such as marriage, loans,
mortgages, tenancy, and hospitality that enabled tribal leaders to “tie the knot of the tribe.” The
various networks of cliental-ism that held extended families together and ensured their belonging
to sub-tribes would have been replaced by direct dependence of nuclear families on the PDPA
and the state bureaucracy. For instance, decree number six provided relief for a broad category
of debts as sharecroppers and laborers were freed from all debt and decree number seven
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established a minimum age for marriage and prohibited the exchange of money involving
marriage, a century old tradition.35
Despite its knowledge about the failure of previous governments to implement similar
reforms, especially those involving thorny issues such as marriage practices, the Soviet-backed
regime presented the decrees as revolutionary, and promised to put an end to “oppressive
patriarchal and feudal conditions.” The implementation of the marriage decree would have
resulted in the transformation of marriage from a social and economic transaction between two
extended families to a private decision taken by two consenting adults. 36 The reforms, however,
while rejected by the majority of Afghans, especially those in rural areas, were welcomed by a
minority of urban Afghans were long wished to modernize their society. 37 As Rasanayagam
writes, “The decree was welcomed in more advanced urban circles where young people were
able to marry the partners of their choice for the first time in Afghan history. But it was
perceived as a frontal attack o tradition by the backward and unlettered people of rural
Afghanistan.”38
Notwithstanding some flaws in the government’s land distribution system, the
government in 1986 announced that as a result of its land-reform policies, almost 3300000
peasant families had received land.

ecree number eight aimed to eliminate “feudal and pre-

feudal conditions” by creating a land ceiling of approximately fifteen acres for first quality land
for each family. Ignoring Afghanistan’s traditionally large family structures, the state defined a
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family as a husband, wife, and unmarried children less than eighteen years of age as forming the
basic unit of land ownership.

This definition was consistent with the proposal to reform

marriage practices and was intended to eliminate larger families and other kinship units as
economic units. Land reform policies were also meant to redistribute wealth and power from the
rural rich to the rural poor so that the state could have replaced local and tribal leaders as the
main source of authority in Afghanistan’s highly fragmented, rural communities. 39
The DRA also distributed a number of other goods through a system of subsidized
consumption for state employees and those who supported the regime.

The government

established special stores similar to those in other socialist countries, offering essential food
items and other products imported from the Eastern bloc.

40

These measures moved Afghanistan

closer toward the “developed socialist” model of social control. Rubin contends, “The degree of
social control attained by the state was sufficient to enable the Soviet-Karmal regime to pursue
its other major strategic goal: ideological formation of the new generation and recruitment to the
party-state through the school, Young Pioneers and other organizations.” For example the
government established Soviet-style tractor stations to provide farmers with affordable
machinery and President Karmal claimed that these stations were to become the “rally point of
peasants”.41
State Attempts to Dominate Falter
State attempts at social transformation and predominance, however, faced several
obstacles; chief among them was a strong backlash from rural and highly tribal communities that
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constituted the majority of the population. Traditionalists saw these reforms as a serious threat to
their power in relation to the state as well as their way of life. As Goodson notes, “The bases of
authority in rural society were the family and the tribe or a clan. Implementation of these reforms
eroded the underpinnings of these bases of authority; consequently, it is hardly surprising that
they were so fiercely resisted.”

42

In addition to the highly tribal and fragmented nature of

Afghan society, the state’s less than adequate capacity to implement its reforms, and the use of
violence as the determining factor in state-society relations were key hindrances to the
implementation and success of such reforms. In rural areas of the country, local traditions rather
than state law played the primary role in defining property relations.
The state’s policy of redistribution disregarded local needs such as adequate irrigation in
certain areas where water, not land was the major constraint on agriculture. Landholdings were
not as significant as previously thought and there wasn’t enough surplus of land to distribute to
all peasants who qualified for state programs. The state’s policy of abolishing peasants’ debts to
landlords and moneylenders without providing them with alternative sources of credit deprived
small farmers of their ability to obtain the loans they needed because landlords fearing nonpayment refused to make any new loans to farmers.43

Nancy Newell writes: “Any one of these programs, tactlessly introduced, would
almost certainly have aroused a bitter reaction among most segments of the
population. When they were introduced together as a package under the red
banner of communism, the effect was catastrophic…Taken together, these
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reforms virtually guaranteed opposition. Their enforcement…was brought home
by government servants who saw no virtue in using tact or diplomacy. Incidents
of protest quickly mushroomed into local armed revolts.”44

More importantly, the choice given to peasants by the state was not between exploitation
and domination on the one hand, and freedom and equality on the other. Their choice was
essentially between leaders they knew and with whom they shared tribal linkages and leaders
they did not know and who represented an alien ideology imported from the Soviet Union that
ran counter to the peasants’ traditional way of life. As Rubin asserts, “Long experience had
taught the peasants that, pernicious as some khans or tribal leaders could be, other were useful in
protecting the village from the state administration, even if the state administration was
Muslim.”45 In addition to the state’s poor formulation of the reforms, its attempts to compensate
for its lack of capacity through brutal means further swayed the rural communities to believe that
proposed reforms would undermine their long-held conservative and tribal traditions.

The

traditional society was also incensed about the way the reforms were carried out, especially land
reforms. Groups of PDPA activists including school teachers, and army officers with no links to
the community, would be dispatched to villages to carry out land reforms. Land reforms in
particular were intended to bolster the state’s position in winning the battle that was raging
between the state and strong tribal leaders over social control.46
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Given Afghanistan’s low level of state capacities, the ability to determine ownership of
land or to extend credit at the local level was beyond the ability of the state. 47 Regime
pronouncements about its plans to eliminate “the unjust patriarchal and feudalistic relations
which exists between husband and wife” caused a great degree of consternation among most
Afghans, especially those in rural areas.48 As Saikal points out government census takers, led
by inexperienced and dogmatic PDPA functionaries poured into villages asking questions about
women’s status, names and ages and otherwise infringing upon family matters of the utmost
intimacy for rural Afghans. He adds, “Country people ended up believing that the communists
were plotting to turn women into communal property.”49 The regime’s introduction of radical
social and political reforms broke the four-decade equilibrium between state and society.50
Afghanistan’s role in the international security system also enhanced the role of violence
with regards to state-society relations. The Afghan state, having been developed in large part
through funding by great powers to serve as a buffer state, suffered from a lack of meaningful
institutions that interacted with society. The state also lacked the necessary legal framework to
operate society’s collective networks, especially its tribal elements. As Saikal points out, the
new rulers of Kabul had to “resort to the patronage of a single foreign power in order to
subordinate the recalcitrant micro-societies.”51 Police presence was limited to large cities and
towns. Except for the official PDPA party-state, the country lacked political parties and civil
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society. In short, there was no civil or political society mediating between the state and its
citizens.
Since state capacities and resources were limited, state autonomy meant that the only
resource available to it to implement its programs was violence. 52 For the first time in almost a
century, violence emerged as the determining factor in relations between the society and the state
as the state policies triggered civil and armed resistance against “Godless communists”. As
Goodson points out most of Afghanistan by 1979 was “in open revolt” against the government
when at least twenty-four of the twenty-eight provinces had suffered from outbreaks of
violence.53 The regime responded to mounting opposition to its reform agenda with more
repression. A year after the new government had assumed power; tens of thousands of regime
opponents had been executed.54 Maley contends, “The new regime was not in a position to
exploit the traditional legitimacy that had helped sustain its predecessors, and in the context of its
grossly overambitious program of social transformation…it was obliged increasingly to resort to
coercion to maintain its position.”55
Regime Fights for Survival
espite the Soviet leadership’s decision to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan in
1989, the former Soviet Union continued its provision of critical economic and military
assistance to the Afghan government. The Soviet-backed government of Dr. Najibullah survived
for three years after the Soviet troops had withdrawn.
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The Soviets continued to provide

extensive support ranging from $250 to $300 million per month and they had left behind
thousands of Soviet military technicians and advisors to support the regime. Afghan Mujahidin
parties mostly based in neighboring Pakistan were fragmented along tribal and ethnic lines and
unable to form a cohesive opposition or effectively challenge the government. According to
Goodson, “The Mujahidin, masters of guerrilla warfare, lacked the cohesiveness essential to
successful conventional warfare.”56 Nevertheless, the loss of over one hundred thousand Soviet
troops and a reduction in Soviet assistance, forced Najibullah’s government to adopt a more
conciliatory approach with its conservative and traditional opponents by moving away from
leftist ideals.57 The government’s new strategy was centered on ensuring its own survival in light
of dwindling Soviet funding and the ever increasing defense budget.
As part of the government’s strategy to ensure its survival after the withdrawal of Soviet
forces, President Najibullah offered the tribal rural-based communities of Afghanistan what they
had always desired, namely, strong local autonomy with generous subsidies of funds and arms.
Building local forces was a two pronged strategy meant to win over disaffected communities
while standing locally autonomous regions intended to combat Mujahedin groups, independent
of the Ministry of Defense in Kabul. The regime bought the loyalties of tribal and local armed
groups with cash, arms and equipment. Rasanayagan writes that a typical Mujahidin commander
that defected was made general, given a house in Kabul and provided the freedom “to enrich
themselves by smuggling, drug-trafficking, and the imposition of road tolls.”58
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The difficulty of securing major supply routes after the departure of Soviet troops
prompted Najibullah’s government to use local militia groups such as General

ostum’s forces

that numbered about 40000 men by 1991. According to Rasanyagan, “Their main task was to
replace the Soviet troops protecting the gas fields and the supply routes from the Soviet border
and southwards…They were all well-equipped mobile force capable of conducting combat
operations outside these areas.”59 Many local commanders, freed from the constraints of the
Soviet presence were also able to achieve financial autonomy by levying tolls on the road
transport by traders, smugglers and government suppliers. Moreover, opium trade also became
an increasingly lucrative source of revenue for local commanders who were beginning to turn
into local strongmen with fickle loyalties to the regime. Poor peasants increasingly turned to
poppy production in regions where cultivation of food crops, particularly in areas where
irrigation systems had been damaged, hardly offered them the means to make a living.60
Regime Weakness Intensifies Ethnic Fragmentation
The regime as part of its strategy to ensure its survival also attempted rebrand itself and
the PDPA as nationalist and Islamic entities with limited success, as its military position
continued to decline and it became fraught with ethnic rivalries. Tomsen asserts that Najibullah’s
stocks of arms and food were dwindling, while the Mujahidin were well supplied and had
reached within 90 miles of Kabul.61 The regime’s commander of 70th Division from the Tajik
ethnic minority in northern Afghanistan defied Najibullah’s order to transfer his command to a
Pashtun general from appointed by the president. The Tajik commander received the support of
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two members of other ethnic communities, the Uzbek commander of the 53rd Division as well as
the Ismaili commander of 80th Division stationed in the northern Afghanistan.62 At last, the
Russian coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev in August of 1991 marked the beginning of the
end for both the Soviet Union and the Afghan government. Goodson notes, “In September 1991
the two superpowers agreed to cut off military assistance to their respective clients …The Soviet
Union also limited economic aid and tightened restrictions on such aid in late 1991.” 63
Developments in the Soviet Union, and the apparent lack of success to achieve
meaningful results with its new policies, the regime’s demise was inching closer.64 As Saikal
points out, “The recycled P PA and army were disintegrating, provincial governors, various
warlords, and field commanders were busy carving up autonomous principalities, striking
alliances of convenience with a healthy disregard for ideological differences.” 65 Finally, with the
breakup of the Soviet Union on 25 December, 1991, the fate of the Soviet-backed government
was sealed.66
Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992-1996): Factionalism and Infighting
“It was as if, at this very moment, on this very spot, a power vacuum replaced
what little central authority still existed in Afghanistan; and that is why, I am
convinced, this even must be given due significance in any history of the
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period.”67 A UN official describing the moment President Najibullah’s UN plane
was prevented from leaving Afghanistan, and implying that the early morning
hours of April 16, 1992 marked the beginning of Afghanistan’s spiral into chaos
and political vacuum.
Political Chaos and Ethnic Fragmentation
The fall of the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan was followed by brutal violence
among rival Mujahedin factions vying for power. Almost from the beginning of the postNajibullah government era, power struggles among ethnic and political contenders degenerated
into violence. Rival factions representing various ethnic groups and political leanings launched
brutal rocket attacks on government and residential areas of Kabul.

According to Ewans,

“Mujahedin rule was characterized by a total inability to agree between themselves on any
lasting political settlement and a readiness to fight each other at the slightest provocation, or
indeed with any apparent provocation at all.”68
The rocket attacks targeting the capital city began in April of 1992 and continued until
the Taliban advance on the city in early 1995. Mujahedin leaders’ persistent divisions were not
only based on personal ambition alone but also included ethnic, tribal and sectarian antipathies.
The fall of Kabul to better organized minority Tajik and Uzbek Mujahedin groups determined
much of the ensuing civil war. This dealt a psychological blow to the Pashtun majority who after
almost three hundred years had lost control of the capital city. One of the most radical Pashtun
Mujahedin leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar laid siege to Kabul and mercilessly shelled it for days
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on end, killing and maiming thousands of civilians and turning the capital into rubble.

69

Continued bombardments of the capital and persistent blockade of supply routes to Kabul mostly
by rival factions, left the city’s residents in a dire state of affairs, forcing tens of thousands to
leave the city for internal or external exile.70 According to Ewans, “It was unacceptable to the
majority Pushtuns in general as it was to Hekmatyar in particular that Rabbani, Massoud, and
ostum, two Tajiks and an Uzbek, should play a leading role in guiding the country’s destiny.71
Although government institutions and the city of Kabul had survived earlier conflicts
unscathed, they were turned into a major battleground by warring parties.

According to

Goodson, “Perhaps as many as 50000 people have been killed and 150000 were wounded there,
and hundreds of thousands fled the city, large areas of which have been reduced to rubble since
1992.”72 Kabul’s control fell to competing groups. While ethnic minorities such as the Tajiks
and Uzbek militias controlled the city center where government buildings were located, their
Pashtun rivals occupied the high ground and suburbs south of the city. The Beirutization of
Kabul made the city into battlefield, and the standard of living fell dramatically, with power and
water supplies erratic and food stocks running low.
The battle for control of Kabul was a microcosm of what happened throughout
Afghanistan during the Mujahedin government, namely, the country’s descent into ethnic
violence and political fragmentation. Competing Mujahidin groups were holding provincial
centers and large cities in almost all corners of the country. Commanders and strongmen did not
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wish to obey the government in Kabul but rather entrench their influence and develop regional
authorities. Although much of the fighting centered on Kabul and several other strategic cities,
the state of the entire country was “characterized by fragmentation and warlordism.”73
Localization of Power and Warlordism
The central government control was largely limited to certain parts of the capital city and
its environs while the rest of Afghanistan had been divided into various zones of local and
regional zones of control along ethno-lingual lines, leaving the population and non-governmental
organizations vulnerable to the rule of local chieftains and strongmen. While one government
affiliated warlord controlled western Afghanistan, another warlord who opposed to the
government controlled the northern Afghanistan.

The eastern part of the country was being

governed by a number of independent councils, and a small region to the south and east of the
capital was under the control of

ekmatyar’s forces. As Rashid writes, “In central Afghanistan

the Hazaras, another minority ethnic group controlled the province of Bamyan.

Southern

Afghanistan and Kandahar were divided up amongst dozens of petty ex-Mujahidin warlords and
bandits who plundered the population at will, with the tribal structure and the economy in
tatters…”74

e adds, “International aid agencies of fearful of even working in Kandahar, one of

Afghanistan’s largest cities, as the city itself was divided by warring groups. Their leaders sold
off everything to Pakistani traders to make money, stripping down telephone wires and poles,
cutting trees, selling off factories, machinery and even road rollers to scrap merchants. The
warlords seized homes and farms, there out their occupants and handed them over to their
supporters. The commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for
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their sexual pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the
streets.”75 The author notes that during a short 130 miles trip from the Pakistani border town of
Quetta to Kandahar, the vehicle he was travelling in was stopped by at least 20 different groups
who had put chains across the road and demanded money for safe passage. These developments
also resulted in a fresh wave of Afghan refugees to neighboring countries.76
Despite repeated UN mediation efforts to bring to broker peace among the warring
Mujahidin factions, no political arrangement could be reached that’d satisfy all the claimants to
power. By 1994, the fragmentation of Afghanistan had deepened because no single Mujahedin
party was powerful enough or enjoyed sufficient legitimacy to militarily defeat other groups.
This stalemate eventually gave rise to the Taliban, a puritanical religious student group.
Although, the Taliban’s arrival on the political scene marked the end of the period of intraMujahedin civil conflict, it probably exacerbated divisions along tribal, ethnic, political and
sectarian lines.77 In short the Islamic State of Afghanistan was in a state of virtual disintegration
before the Taliban’s emergence on the political scene.
Rubin sums up the Afghan state during Mujahidin rule in the following way: “Perhaps
this entity was Islamic, but it was hardly a state, and it certainly did not rule Afghanistan. The
government had virtually no income. All major customs’ posts, the government’s principle
sources of revenue in the absence of foreign aid or natural gas exports, were under the control of
regional shuras or councils that kept custom revenues for themselves. Tens of thousands of
armed men, belonging to a number of forces or to none, roamed the streets of the capital looting,
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fighting, and sometimes raping. With neither tax revenue nor foreign aid, the government paid
the disparate groups that constituted its armed forces by distributing freshly printed banknotes
that continued to arrive by plane from Russia.”78
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001): Brutal Force and Religious Totalitarianism
Pashtun Chauvinism and Religion as Political Legitimator
The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar on 4 April, 1996, on the roof of a building in the
center of the city wrapped himself in the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad, which had been
taken out of its shrine after 60 years, and declared himself the Amir-ul Momineen, or the leader
of the faithful in front of a throng of mullahs or religious clerics who jubilantly embraced him.
The title gave Omar the legitimacy that he badly needed among the majority Pashtun ethnic
group and to contest the leadership of Afghanistan. The Taliban movement’s religious fervor and
Pashtun ethnocentrism appealed to most Pashtuns while traditionalists from other ethnic groups
were willing to give them a try after the chaotic rule of the Mujahedin. After months of bloody
battles, the Taliban’s refusal to compromise with the warring Mujahedin factions or allow the
United Nations to mediate finally paid off. After only about four years of the minority Tajik
government, the Afghan capital was back in the hands of the majority Pashtuns. Taliban’s
ethnocentric policies aimed at entrenching Pashtun domination only deepened existing ethnic
divisions.79 80
Taliban movement’s plans for Afghanistan’s social and economic development remained
ambiguous as the regime was preoccupied with spreading its own brand of Islam and
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consolidating its military domination. Mullah Wakil, an aide to the Taliban leader proclaimed,
“The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to
officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes and weapons. We want to live a life like the
Prophet lived 1400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet
and are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years.”81 Taliban’s
model of government was probably similar to that of other hardline Islamic currents that call for
dependence on a single charismatic leader to lead the nation as opposed to relying on a more
democratically constituted organization.
This model did not advocate the building of institutions, but rather insisted on the
character and purity of the leader, his virtues and qualifications and whether his personality can
emulate that of the Prophet Muhammad. Mullah Wakil, the Taliban leader’s aide described the
Taliban government’s decision making process in the following manner: “ ecisions are based on
the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We abide by the
Amir’s view even if he alone takes the view. There will not be a head of state. Instead there will
be an Amir ul-Momineen. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority and the government will
not be able to implement any decisions to which he does not agree. General elections are
incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them.”82
The state under the Taliban lacked a regular or professional army, relying instead largely
on volunteer students of religious schools to fill its ranks. Regular Taliban fighters numbered
25000 to 30000 but they were able to call up volunteers before new offensives. The Taliban
government took a hap-hazard approach toward enlistment, making it almost impossible to
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create a regular, disciplined army. Taliban fighters consisted of many students who would join
the frontlines for a short or long period of time. For example, students from Pakistani religious
schools made up about 30 percent of Taliban manpower that served for short periods before
returning to their religious schools and sending back fresh recruits. Rashid claims, “Taliban
fighters resemble a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force…The majority of fighters are not
paid salaries and it’s up to the commander to pay his men an adequate sum of money when they
go on home leave.”83 Nevertheless, the Taliban state did pay regular salaries to military officers
who were professionally trained by and fought for the former army under the communist regime.
These professionals included tank drivers, gunners, pilots, and mechanics who had essentially
become mercenaries.84
Brutal Force and Negligible Governance
As part of its overall strategy to consolidate its dominance over Afghanistan, the Taliban
government did not shy away from using brutal force to suppress its opponents while at the same
time providing little to no governance to the population. Gohari asserts, “The Taliban militiamen
and their allies including militant Muslims from neighboring Pakistan systematically executed
between 2000 and 5000 civilians in of the deadliest mass killings…They also searched house to
house for males of fighting age who belonged to the Hazara ethnic minority, gunned them down
in front of their families or had their throats cut.”

85

For many ethnic minorities the Taliban rule

represented a return of Pashtun chauvinism and religious totalitarianism. In their quest to defeat
last remnants of opposition to their rule, the Taliban sought to frighten the population into
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submission. In the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, the last stronghold of Taliban opposition,
after seizing the city, “Taliban shock troops arriving in trucks and cars fired automatic weapons
at everyone in sight, regardless of ethnicity” asserts Gohari.86
Governance under Taliban rule was chaotic, ineffective and minimal at best. They lacked
the capabilities and the willingness to formulate a coherent governance strategy. Taliban leaders,
who were mostly clergymen, were asked to serve in both military and civilian capacities. The
Taliban military council included several ministers and governors such as the health minister.
“The health minister was pulled out and sent to Herat province to organize another offensive and
finally returned to his job six months later, leaving UN aid agencies who he was dealing with in
consternation”, asserts Rashid. Assigning a minister both civilian and military responsibilities
had an enormously negative impact on the government’s performance. This system made sure
that a ministry’s work would be idled when the minister was away on the frontlines and that no
Taliban minister became “proficient in his job or created a local power base through patronage.
The Taliban leader would send any minister back to the front line at a moment’s notice if he was
becoming politically too powerful, ensuring that the country remained without clearly defined
leadership roles. Rashid who visited a number of ministries during Taliban rule, recounts
“Ministers’ desks are empty of files and government offices are empty of the public…with
nobody available to answer queries in the ministries…The public ceased to expect anything of
the ministries while the lack of local representation made the Taliban appear as an occupying
force, rather than administrators trying to win hearts and minds.”87
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Politics of Ethnicity and Misrule
Governance was further weakened when the Taliban decided to purge Kabul’s
bureaucracy of almost all bureaucrats that were considered a threat to the regime. Although highranking officials had left Kabul, lower level bureaucrats had remained in place since the fall of
the Soviet-backed government in 1992.

In particular, Taliban replaced all government

employees that belonged to minority ethnic groups with fellow Pashtuns. This probably marked
the first time in Afghanistan’s modern history that government ministries were purged of
employees belonging to minority ethnic groups, turning members of ethnic minorities against
Taliban rule.

espite Afghanistan’s facing severe economic and social challenges, Taliban

government offices worked only four hours per day. According to Rashid, the government’s
official revenue was derived from drug’s income, and aid mostly from Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia.

e adds, “Mullah Omar runs the war from his tin trunks stuffed full of money, which he

keeps under his bed, making a national budget next to impossible.”88
Another debilitating factor for governance during the Taliban rule was that almost all
Taliban ministers were mullahs or clergymen with little to no formal education. For instance, the
Ministry of Finance had no qualified economist or banker and it had set the 1997 budget for the
entire country at US$100000, an amount that barely covered the government employees’
salaries.89 A senior United Nations official in Afghanistan noted, “Although the Taliban
technically control most of Afghanistan, they do not have the means to administer and run public
services in a centralized fashion: each region is administered by local Taliban authorities who
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appear to act quite autonomously.”

90

The Taliban seemed unconcerned with the day-to-day

issues of governing, Rashid points out, stressing that they seemed to have no concept of
economic policy beyond “Allah will provide.”

91

Although, the Taliban seemed to lack any

interest in assuming the responsibilities of a government, they were quite effective in reclaiming
the state’s monopoly on the use of force, an essential attribute of a state, because they refused to
engage in any power-sharing agreements with their opponents and were bent on confronting the
last pockets of resistance militarily.92
Taliban government while controlling 90 percent of the country and claiming to be the
government could assume only minimal governmental functions because it lacked administrative
capacity and abdicated its responsibility for the welfare of ordinary Afghans. The United
Nations estimated that some 3.8 million people were close to famine conditions with the World
Food Program feeding 3 million Afghans a day in cities as well as large camps set up for
internally displaced people.93 In Kabul alone, over fifty percent of its 1.2 million people received
some form of aid from Western donor agencies.94
Taliban also neglected to provide public goods even in the most critical areas such as
healthcare and education. The healthcare system, despite showing much promise before the
beginning of conflicts, was neglected and dilapidated under the Taliban. Afghanistan had the
highest infant mortality rates in the world, namely 163 deaths per 1000 births or about 18
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percent. A staggering 1700 mothers out of 100000 died while giving birth. During the Taliban
regime, only 29 percent of the population had access to health care services and 12 percent had
access to safe water compared to 80 percent and 70 percent respectively in other developing
countries. Rashid asserts, “Children die of simple preventable diseases like measles and diarrhea
because there are no health facilities and clean water.” 95
Taliban’s education policies in general and their gender policies in particular severely
restricted access to education for both female and male students. They allowed only religious
schools to become the main source of primary and secondary education. Within three months of
capturing the capital, Taliban closed 63 schools in Kabul, affecting about 103000 girls, 148000
boys and 11200 teachers, 7800 of them were women. They also shut down the country’s premier
university, Kabul University, and sent home over 10000 students.

A UNICEF report in

December 1998 described the education system under the Taliban as “in a state of total collapse
with nine in ten girls and two in three boys not enrolled in school.”96 During the Taliban rule,
there were only about 1.2 million students enrolled in schools, with less than 50,000 of them
girls although there were over four million school-aged children in Afghanistan, leaving almost
three million school-aged children without access to education.97
Conclusion
The 1978 coup and the emergence of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan upended
the delicate balance of power between the state and society and put an end to a state of relative
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peace and stability that had existed since the 1930s.98 The communist government’s bold
attempts to assert its dominance over society ran counter to previous governments’ practice of
securing the compliance of semi-autonomous tribes through non-coercive means. As Saikal
points out, “The non-coercive component of the mechanism of state domination was particularly
significant in Afghanistan: even with a modern army and police force at its disposal, the central
government preferred to secure the compliance of autonomous social units by channeling rentierincome, mostly in the form of foreign aid.”99
State attempts to redefine its relationship with society sharpened resistance to the state.
To compensate for its lack of capacity and crush the rebellion from traditionalists, the state
increasingly relied on coercive means that intensified the backlash from Afghanistan’s
conservative society. Although, generous Soviet assistance helped the state assert itself to a
certain extent and cling onto power for over a decade, this support was not inadequate to help the
state sustain or expand its dominance, heightening the tension in state-society relations. The
resulting conflict between the state and society ultimately gave way to dramatic shifts in the
make-up of Afghan society and the disintegration of Afghanistan as governable sovereign state
for at least another decade.100
As the political, social and economic data under the past three regimes indicate, the
Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (1979-1992), was relatively stable and could
deliver some public goods such as access to education and health care services to the majority of
the population. The state also managed to maintain relative monopoly on the use of force in
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much of the urban centers by utilizing its powerful security and intelligence apparatus. Its
successor, the Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992-1996), however, was characterized by political
chaos and deepening ethnic fragmentation. The state lacked capacity in the form of functioning
government departments, police units, and judiciary. It’s monopoly on the use of force was
severely limited and its authority was diminished by armed factions, and the emergence of
warlords in all corners of the country.
Politico-ethnic violence in and around the capital as well as in urban centers plunged
Afghanistan into a state of lawlessness and stalemate with neither Mujahedin group powerful
enough to assert itself as the dominant player. 101 The subsequent Taliban regime (1996-2001)
ousted the warring Mujahedin factions by force and quickly put an end to the state of lawlessness
and warlordism. However, the Taliban regime while reclaiming its monopoly on the use of force
used its own interpretation of Islam as means for domination. Aside from their monopoly on the
use of force the Taliban regime presided over a dilapidated government bureaucracy that
possessed neither the means nor the capacity to provide any meaningful form of governance,
particularly to women, who were denied access to health care and education. Ethnic and gender
discrimination was used by the Taliban regime to entrench its rule, further exacerbating sociopolitical fragmentation.

The state’s lack of financial resources, professional governing

mechanisms, and its isolation from the international community essentially rendered it futile in
providing much needed governance apart from security.102
The experience of the Afghan communists and Islamists during the past two decades
indicates that both suffered from similar weaknesses and limitations. Both, as an all inclusive
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ideologies rejected instead of integrating the vastly different social, ethnic and sectarian
identities that constituted the Afghan society. Both trends attempted to impose radical change on
a traditional social structure by a revolution from the top. By taking control of the state, these
movements sought to do away with tribalism and traditional religious values long embraced by
mainstream Afghans. In essence, both Afghan leftists and the Taliban refused to accept the
complex realities of the Afghan society, lending credence to Roy’s assertion that Muslim
societies in the twentieth century have been divided between two structures, namely, the clan,
tribe and ethnic groups on the one side, and the state and religion on the other.103
Both the communist and the Taliban state sought to augment or supplant the role of
leaders who were regarded as traditional bearers of authority. These leaders included village and
tribal leaders who were responsible for implementing functions of political exchange based on
well-established canons of group solidarity. The Mujahedin era, on the other hand, was marked
by lawlessness, a vacuum of authority, and deepening socio-political fragmentation.104
Afghanistan’s tumultuous history during these two decades can be summed up as a
conflict that began between the modernizers and the traditionalists, deepening socio-political
fragmentation and ultimately culminating in the collapse of the state. While the elite, particularly
disaffected youth and the officer corps, thanks to the influence of the Soviet Union in the 1970s,
found their most effective expression as a leftist movement, the state’s attacks on religion and its
imposition of secular values prompted Afghan tribes to rebel. After a chaotic and conflictplagued Mujahedin government, Taliban’s rise exemplified the triumph of religious
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totalitarianism at the expense of those wishing to build a functional and viable state.105

106

During this tumultuous period in Afghanistan, it’s been minority ethnic groups against the
majority or small group versus the larger faith or the tribe versus the Ummah that has served as
the main focus of loyalty and commitment rather than the state.”
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Forces seeking to build a

viable Afghan state are likely to face significant hurdles as fundamental questions about the
concept
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CHAPTER IV
THE SEVERTITY OF STATE FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE REALIST
THEORY
Introduction
Max Weber defines a modern state as “a compulsory association with a territorial basis
where the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or
prescribed by it. The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it
as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous organization.”1 While the central
and unitary character of the state remains an important principle of Realism, questions about
state type, the emergence of state decay and its impact on international relations have been left
ambiguous.
Conversely, given the increasing number of security threats emanating from failed states,
efforts to prop up such states have become a major area of interest for the international
community, in particular the policy-making and donor communities. This marks a clear shift
from the 1980s when the market through structural adjustment mechanisms was expected to deal
with issues concerning the dilapidation of nation-states. The international community’s
interventions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, aimed at helping rebuild the
state appears to serve as the preferred course of action in countries where the state is failing. The
threat of state “failure” focuses attention on the soon-to-crumble countries.

For such a

classification to be useful, however, it must be more objective, more precise, and more
discriminating than the popular conception of what may or may not constitute a “failed” state.
According to Rotberg, rather than lumping countries together qualitatively, the title of “failed
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state” should distinguish countries at risk and tell us whether the countries in question
demonstrate certain characteristics that illustrate the extent of failure, rather than merely evoking
a nebulous sense of dysfunction.2
Rotberg establishes a set of clear criteria in order to distinguish state failure from generic
weakness or apparent distress, or even state collapse. He analyzes the nature of state weakness
and advances motives as to why some weak states succumb to failure, or collapse, while others
remain weak and don’t fail. Characterizing failed states thus becomes an important and relevant
endeavor; particularly as state failure is likely to pose significant security, economic and other
threats to the global political order.
This chapter will use Robert Rotberg’s and Foreign Policy Magazine’s (FP) indicators for
failure to identify the emergence and severity of state failure in Afghanistan. I will also link the
paper’s conceptual framework, Realism’s emphasis on the unitary nature of the state, to a host of
indicators for collapsed, weak, and failed states as put forward by Rotberg and FP.3 4 While no
single indicator provides certain evidence that a strong state is becoming weak or a weak state is
headed toward failure, a judicious assessment of these indicators taken together and discussed
below should provide a qualitative assessment about the strength of the Afghan state from 1978
to 2001. This chapter will conclude by discussing the prospects of building a viable state in a
strong and deeply fragmented society such as Afghanistan.
2
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Implications of State Fragility for Global Security

Although the rise and fall of nation-states is not a new phenomenon, in an era when
nation-states constitute the building blocks of the global order, the disintegration or fragility of
some states could pose serious threats to this order. As nations perilously waver between
weakness and failure, with some failing, or even collapsing, desirable international norms such
as stability and predictability become conditions difficult to achieve. This is particularly relevant
in a time when the international community is grappling with an ever increasing number of
security threats such as those posed by state failure in Afghanistan. Thus, understanding the
nature of and responding to the dynamics of nation-states facing failure has become a central
component of policy debates in the hope of bolstering weak states and preventing failure.5
Boege et al’s findings suggest the focus of the security and development environment
remains on the “lack of willingness or capacity of state institutions to perform core state
functions in the fields of security, representation and welfare.” Rotberg adds, “Nation-states fail
because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political
goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the
particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing
plurality of its citizens.”6 Boege et al’s findings also suggest that there is consensus among
international actors that different degrees of state fragility or state failure can be identified, that
the phenomenon is increasing, and that the solution generally recommended is state-building.
This includes strengthening of state institutions in addition to enhancing the capacities of state
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actors for control, regulation and implementation, particularly in the core fields of state-hood
such as internal security, basic social services, rule of law and government legitimacy. 7 8 9
Unique Challenges and State Weakness
Rotberg’s characterization of weak states includes a broad continuum of states that are
regarded to be inherently weak because of the geographical, physical, or fundamental economic
constraints that they are confronting. A weak state’s ability to provide adequate measures of
public goods is diminished or diminishing. In a weak state, infrastructure has deteriorated and
schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, particularly outside the main cities while Gross
Domestic Product per capita and other critical economic indicators have fallen or are falling with
corruption being rampant. Weak states usually honor rule of law guidelines in the breach, harass
civil society and are often ruled by despots regardless of whether they hold elections or not.10
Rotberg contends that while weak states characteristically harbor ethnic, religious,
linguistic, or other inter-communal tensions that have not yet become openly violent, failed
states are deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. He adds that
in most failed states, government troops battle civil unrest in the form of insurgencies and other
battles waged by rivals that could be the result of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent
directed at the state or the ruling class.11
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FP touches on the qualitative dimensions of state decay, claiming that each weak state is
beset by a unique set of troubles. It concurs with Rotberg’s assessments that state failure cannot
be traced to one issue only but rather to a diverse set of factors reflecting each country’s unique
set of challenges. More importantly FP points out that given every country’s unique set of
circumstances, factors that contribute to state failure are not universal. It goes on to argue that
one country's chief woe may be staggering economic decline while another country’s is the rapid
brain drain that jeopardizes its economic growth. It goes on to identify a number of indicators
that lead to state failure. These include: Pervasive infectious diseases, refugees, illegitimate
governments, brain drain, lack of public services, group grievances caused by a range of issues,
from government neglect to active persecution, economic decline that points to regimes rigging
their economies to funnel profits into regime hands — even with their national markets in
complete collapse, security forces, factionalized elites where clan organizations vie for control
throughout the country, internal shake-ups that have made the government blatantly unstable,
and external intervention to judge whether the state alone has the capacity to direct the country’s
future.12
Delivery of Political Goods and State Performance
Nation-states’ foremost purpose in existing is to provide a decentralized method of
delivering political goods to persons living within its borders. Rotberg defines political goods as
those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens are making on nation-states and the
states seek to answer citizens’ demands. States organize and channel the interests of their people,
often but not solely in advancing of national goals and values. States are also expected to buffer
or manipulate external forces and influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their
12
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supporters, mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena as well as
the dynamism of their own internal economic, political, and social realities. 13
Rotberg stresses, however, that nation-states succeed or fail across all or some of these
dimensions and their performance is judged by whether they are effective in delivering most
crucial political goods. The delivery of political goods essentially distinguishes strong states
from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed ones. Nation-states encompass
expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give
content to the social contract that exists between the ruler and the ruled and one that forms the
basis for interactions between the government and citizenry.
While the delivery of political goods is the single most crucial factor in determining state
strength, not all political goods are weighed equally. Among them, none is as critical as the
supply of security, especially population security. Although, individuals in particular
circumstances can attempt to secure themselves or band together to organize and purchase goods
or services that ensures their security, private security initiatives cannot substitute the full range
of state-sanctioned public security. Thus, the state’s prime function is to provide that political
good of security—to thwart cross-border invasions and infiltrations, address domestic threats
against the national order, provide population security; and a safe environment peaceful
resolution of disputes without resorting to violence, according to Rotberg. Once a reasonable
measure of security has been sustained, the delivery of other political goods becomes possible.14
Nation-states also provide their citizens with predictable and systematized methods of
adjudicating disputes. The essence of this political good typically implies codes and procedures
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that constitute an enforceable rule of law, security of property and inviolable contracts, a judicial
system, and a set of values that legitimize and validate the national version of fair play.15
Another key political good involves the creation of necessary conditions for political
participation that is free of fear and intimidation. FP posits that this good encompasses other
important freedoms such as the right to compete for office, respect and support for national and
regional political institutions, human and civil rights and political dissent. Other political goods
typically supplied by states and expected by the citizenry include medical care and educational
opportunities as well physical infrastructure such as roads, communications infrastructure, and
the promotion of civil society etc.16 This collection of political goods establishes a set of criteria
according to which modern nation-states may be judged strong, weak, or failing. Clearly, strong
states perform well across these categories whereas weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling
expectations in some areas and performing poorly in others.
Weak states that perform more poorly across a spectrum of fields become weaker, edging
toward failure, hence the subcategory of weakness that is termed as failing. Many failed states
fall short of passing each of the tests outlined above. However, they need not flunk all of them to
fail overall, particularly since satisfying the security good weighs very heavily, and high levels of
internal violence are associated directly with failure and the predisposition to fail.17
Key Indicators of State Failure
Even in nation-states with inherent weaknesses, failure is not predetermined. Countries
suffering from poverty and a colonial past while predisposed to failure do not necessarily have to
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fail. Rotberg cites Botswana as an example of an extremely poor country at independence, a
“dejected excuse” for a nation state, but one that was successfully transformed into a strong
enough state to take full advantage of a subsequent, and much unexpected resource boom. He
contends that it is not a state’s geographical location that serves as the main flaw, but rather what
has been made of the challenges and opportunities of a given outline that determines whether the
state remains weak, becomes stronger, or slides toward failure and collapse.18
Esty et al.’s findings suggest that ethnic wars are key contributors to state collapse. The
findings describe state failure and collapse as the new labels for a type of severe political crisis
exemplified by events of the early 1990s in Afghanistan where the institutions of the state were
so weakened that they could no longer maintain authority or political order beyond the certain
parts of the capital city.19 Under the Mujahedin rule the Afghan capital witnessed heavy fighting
among various groups over control of different neighborhoods. Intense fighting in Kabul also
resulted in the displacement of the city’s population to internal and external exile.20
Esty et al.’s study also suggests that among other barometers, high infant mortality rates
and whether government is based on a democratic system serve as important indicators of state
failure. This assertion is based on the assumption that democratic states respond to popular
discontent. Consequently, democratic states try to accommodate political dissent and maintain
institutional and normative inhibitions against gross human rights violations, indicating that the
state has not failed. The findings conclude that states that are failing or have failed do not

18
19
20

Ibid., 11–15.
Ibid., 20–22.
Rashid, Taliban, 21–22.

95

respond or accommodate effectively, which essentially sets them apart from strong states.21
Hence, the Afghan state’s policy of accommodating the society ceased with the coup of the
Soviet-backed regime in 1978, setting the state for a contentious relationship between the state
and society for over the next two decades.
Crossing from weakness into failure takes will as well as neglect, claims Rotberg. Thus,
weak nation-states need not tilt toward failure. In the case of Columbia, it is argued that an
otherwise well-endowed, prosperous, and a seemingly stable state controlled only two-thirds of
its territory, while private armies controlled large zones carved out of the very body of the state.
Colombia was tense and disturbed, boasting the second highest annual per capita murder rate in
the world where politicians and businessmen traveled with armed guards, a clear indicator of the
state’s inability to ensure personal security.22
Even so, Kline argues that the Columbian state was still able to deliver schooling and
medical care, set-up the country’s physical and communications infrastructure, and provide
economic opportunity.

These public goods made sure the Columbian state sustained it

legitimacy. While the state remained weak because of the multiple insurgencies it was
confronting, it was comparatively strong and performed well in areas under its control. The
government of Colombia can certainly re-insert itself into the disputed zones and further reduce
the power of drug traffickers, thereby extending its reach. In short, it is possible for a weak and
endangered state to move farther away from potential failure and gain strength, adds Rotberg.
He cautions, however, that if states achieve security through harsh punishment and the use of the
security apparatus, their legitimacy is likely to wane before vanishing whenever the curtain of
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control lifts.23 This is particularly relevant to the rule of the Taliban. Although, their emergence
in the wake of lawlessness and chaos was initially welcomed by many Afghans, their harsh
punishment methods such as public executions and amputations cost them their legitimacy.
From Failure to Collapse
Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring
factions. In most failed states, government forces battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals
because the state faces civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a surplus of
dissent directed at it from groups within it, according to Rotberg. These conflicts are usually
rooted in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal antagonism and the fear of the
other drives much of the ethnic conflict and fuels hostilities between regimes and other rival
groups. Robert asserts, “There is no failed state without disharmonies between communities.”24
Rotberg’s characterization of the root causes of intra-state conflict is consistent with the main
triggers of the Afghan conflict in 1990s. Rashid adds, “Afghanistan’s divisions are multiple:
ethnic, sectarian, rural and urban, educated and uneducated, those with guns and those who have
been disarmed. The economy is a black hole that is sucking in its neighbors with illicit trade and
the smuggling of drugs and weapons, undermining them in the process.”25
Additionally, failed states, unlike strong states, cannot control their borders; lose
authority over parts of their territory, and often their official expression of power is limited to the
capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. A failed state will neither be able to
establish an atmosphere of security nationally, nor project power and official authority. Given a
general lack of security and the culture of impunity, officials often victimize their own citizens or
23
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a particular group that is regarded as hostile due to ethnic or other inter-communal hostility.
This compels citizens to turn to warlords and other strongmen who claim ethnic affiliation and
solidarity with them and offering them a relative measure of security when the state itself is
crumbling.26
States that have failed also exhibit flawed institutions. Generally only the institution of
the executive functions since the legislative branch is rubber-stamping machine, if it exists at all.
The bureaucracy has lost much of its luster and is heavily involved in corrupt activities. For
example, during the Taliban regime, state bureaucracy had come to a standstill because it was
gutted of all bureaucrats that belonged to rival ethnic groups.27 Government offices worked only
four hours per day despite the country facing severe political and economic crises where millions
suffered from extreme poverty and thousands died of malnutrition.28 The armed forces of failed
states, while maintaining some integrity, are often politicized. A failed state also lacks effective
educational and health systems. Teachers, physicians, nurses are paid late or not at all, while
absenteeism increases. Textbooks and medicines become scarce. Citizens, especially rural
parents, students, and patients slowly realize that the state has abandoned them to their own
devices and to the forces of nature. Literacy rates fall, infant mortality rises, and an already poor
citizenry has been further impoverished, according to Rotberg. 29
Afghanistan during the Taliban regime displayed most of the indicators for failed states
put forward by Rotberg and FP. For example, the Taliban regime severely restricted access to
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education by allowing only religious schools to become the main source of education. By
closing down hundreds of schools, about three million school-aged children were denied
education. A UNICEF report from ecember 1998 described the education system as “in a state
of total collapse with nine in ten girls and two in three boys not enrolled in school.” 30 The
Taliban government possessed neither the capacity nor the willingness to provide any
governance even to the neediest citizens. The government’s “official” revenue was derived
mostly from drug’s income with the Taliban leader running the war against his domestic
opponents from his tin trunk stuffed full of money, which he kept under his bed.31 According to
UN estimates some 3.8 million Afghans were living under close to famine conditions.32 Over 50
percent of its 1.2 million people in Kabul alone received some form of aid from Western donor
agencies.33
The healthcare system was neglected and dilapidated under the Taliban and Afghanistan
boasted the highest infant mortality rates in the world. Only 29 percent of the population had
access to health care services and 12 percent had access to safe water compared to 80 percent
and 70 percent respectively in other developing countries.

34

Rashid writes, “Children die of

simple preventable diseases like measles and diarrhea because there are no health facilities and
clean water.”35 While the Taliban had succeeded to consolidate their rule over most of
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Afghanistan, the public essentially ceased to expect any other public goods from the Taliban
government.36 Taliban government’s disposition toward the provision of public goods was
consistent with Rotberg’s assertion that, “A failed state is a polity that is no longer able or
willing to perform the fundamental jobs of a nation-state in the modern world.”37
A nation-state also fails when it loses legitimacy, groups within its borders seek
autonomy and its rulers are perceived to be working for themselves and their kin and not for the
state undermining the overall legitimacy of the state.38 Taliban’s purge of state bureaucracy by
replacing all government employees that belonged to ethnic minorities with fellow Pashtuns gave
non-Pashtuns, forming over half the population, the perception that the state had been taken over
by one ethnic group.

This indicator is also consistent with other failed states when the

population increasingly conceives the state to be owned by an exclusive class or group, and when
other groups are pushed aside.

Lack of political goods, local representation and brutal force

made the Taliban government appear as an occupying force, rather than administrators trying to
win hearts and minds.39 The Taliban government’s posture was consistent with another indicator
for a failed state in which the social contract that binds inhabitants to an overarching polity
becomes breached and the majority of citizens stop trusting the state. Citizens of a failed state
tend to rely on community loyalties as their main recourse in times of insecurity and
monopolization of the state. Although, given the fragmented nature of Afghan society, clan and
tribal loyalties always featured prominently, they were intensified further by the ever deepening
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socio-political fragmentation over the two decades. Afghan citizens transferred their allegiances
to clan and group leaders, some of whom became strongmen and warlords.

40

This underscores

the increasing prevalence and influence of strongmen and warlords during the past two decades
in Afghanistan.
Collapsed State or Law of the Jungle
A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state where political goods are
obtained through private or ad hoc means. While security is equated with the rule of the strong,
there is a vacuum of authority in a collapsed state. As Rotberg asserts, “There is dark energy, but
the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of
order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens) embraced by
language or ethnic affinities or borders.” Rotberg’s indicators of a collapsed state are consistent
with the breakdown of authority under the Mujahedin rule, giving rise to sub-state actors.41
Competing Mujahidin groups were holding provincial centers and large cities throughout
Afghanistan where strongmen did not obey the central government and consolidated their own
influence.42

43

These warlords or sub-state actors gained control over regions and sub-regions

within what was a nation-state. Afghan strongmen built up their own local security apparatuses
and mechanisms, sanctioned markets and other trading arrangements, and even established an
attenuated form of international relations. As Rotberg and FP point out a collapsed state by
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definition is illegitimate and unrecognized, warlords can assume the trappings of a new quasi
state. 44
Consistent with the indicators of a collapsed state, during the Mujahedin rule, General
Rashid Dostum, a strongman in the north, had created his own fiefdom in northern Afghanistan.
e engaged in trade and commerce with the country’s northern neighbors, particularly
Uzbekistan. Ismail Khan, another strongman controlled four provinces in western Afghanistan
and enjoyed close political, military and trade relations with Iran.

Warlords in southern

Afghanistan seized homes and farms, forcing their occupants out and handing them over to their
ethnic and political affiliates. Local strongmen also traumatized the population by kidnapping
young girls and boys for their sexual pleasure and robbing merchants in the bazaars and set up
numerous road blocks extort money for safe passage.45
The Afghan state during the Mujahedin rule was hardly a state because it had virtually no
income and thousands of armed men roamed the streets of the capital looting, fighting, and
sometimes raping, asserts Rubin. Without tax revenue or foreign aid, the government had no
funds to provide any political goods to its population. The Mujahedin government paid the
disparate groups that constituted its armed forces by distributing freshly printed banknotes that
were fast losing their value due to hyper-inflation.46 According to Goodson Afghanistan under
the Mujahedin government was “characterized by fragmentation and warlordism.”47
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Table 1: Foreign Policy Magazine’s Indicators of State Failure
The index's ranking is based on economic, social and political indicators that assess a state’s
vulnerability to collapse and conflict.48
Economic

Political

Social

Sharp and/or severe economic decline: measured by a
progressive economic decline of the society as a whole (using:
per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty
levels, business failures.) A sudden drop in commodity prices,
trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments. Collapse or
devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden
economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital
flight. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government
employees and armed forces or to meet other financial
obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments. Emergence
of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed
struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security
forces. Intervention of other states or external factors: military
or Paramilitary engagement in the internal affairs of the state at
risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that
affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict.
Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards
over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.49
Progressive deterioration of public services: a disappearance of
basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to
protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide
essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public
transportation. Use of state apparatus for agencies that serve the
ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central
bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.50
Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced
peoples: forced uprooting of large communities as a result of
random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food
shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and
turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security
problems, both within and between countries.51
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Table 2: Rotberg’s Phases of State Decay and Manifestation of State Failure in Afghanistan

Afghanistan Weak
Monarchy,
State
followed by
Republic of
Afghanistan
1919-1978

The state presents a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations in some areas
and performing poorly in others. The state harbors ethnic, religious,
linguistic, or other inter-communal tensions that have not yet become
overtly violent. The state’s ability to provide adequate measures of other
political goods is diminished or diminishing. Physical infrastructural
networks have deteriorated. GDP per capita and other critical economic
indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of
venal corruption are high and escalating.52

Afghanistan Failed
Democratic State
Republic of
Afghanistan
1978-1992

Much of the violence is directed against the existing government or
regime. There are civil wars that usually stem from or have roots in ethnic,
religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal enmity. The state cannot
control its borders or lose authority over sections of territory where the
official power is often limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically
specific zones. The state is unable to establish an atmosphere of security
nationwide and often struggles to project power and official authority.
Limited quantities of essential political goods are provided where citizens
would turn to warlords and other non-state actors their role as the preferred
suppliers of political goods.53

Islamic
Emirate of
Afghanistan
1996-2001
Afghanistan Collapsed A rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained
through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the
Islamic
State
strong and a vacuum of authority exists. It is a mere geographical
Republic of
expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. Sub-state
Afghanistan
actors take over when the prime polity disappears.54
1992-1996
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Human Agency and State Failure
Designations of state failure are rather dynamic than static. Lebanon, Nigeria, and
Tajikistan are countries that have recovered from being a collapsed state and are now weak,
underlining the fluidity of state failure. A state’s movement forward to weakness and backward
into collapse remains always possible. As this chapter demonstrates, while there are a number of
factors that contribute to state failure, the role of human agency cannot be ignored. This is also
illustrated in the example of some African nations. Some despotic African leaders extracted all
their countries’ resources only to enrich themselves and their kin, forcing their weak states to
move toward failure. For example, Zaire under Mobuto and Zimbabwe under Mugabe are good
examples of this phenomenon. Mobuto used the wealth of Zaire to stash hundreds of millions of
dollars in his personal bank accounts and hardly devoted any resources toward uplifting his
people, improving their welfare, building infrastructures, or even providing more than
rudimentary amounts of human security. President Mugabe, on the other hand, personally led
Zimbabwe from strength to the verge of failure. His dictatorial and corrupt rule bled the
resources of the state into his own pockets, squandering foreign exchange, discouraging domestic
and international investment and driving his country to the very brink of starvation. 55
In the case of Afghanistan, the role of human agency in fueling the conflict was
particularly paramount during the civil war in the mid-1990s. Hekmatyar, Rabbani and other
warlords tried to prevent Afghans other than their own ethnic group from sharing the perquisites
of governance.56 Their narrowly focused, self-enriching decisions moved the state from failure to
collapse and gave rise to the puritanical and brutal Taliban regime. Taliban’s policy of harboring
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international terrorists on Afghan soil completed Afghanistan’s transformation from a collapsed
state to a “rogue” state. The country was condemned and isolated as a pariah state by the
international community for brutalizing its own population, especially ethnic minorities and
women, and harboring international terrorist networks such as al-Qaida. 57
Conclusion
The experience of the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan clearly
demonstrates that unless there is a close connection between the state and deep sources of
individual and collective identities such as kin, tribe, and community; swift modernization
reforms despite external support, will face insurmountable difficulties in garnering adequate
support and legitimacy from society. Indeed, confrontation between the state and society is
likely to deepen socio-political fragmentation and result in violent conflict. The failure of the
Afghan state over the past two decades can be traced to the victory of Soviet-supported Afghan
leftist coup in 1978. Though, the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan provided
an array of political goods including relative monopoly on the use of force, a certain level of
security, education and healthcare to a large segment of the population, it had to fight an ever
growing insurgency.
The insurgency against the state was in large part a backlash from traditionalists over
state attempts to assert its predominance through rapid social and political reforms. The state, in
its attempt to crush armed opposition resorted to violence and suppression. It nearly destroyed
the socio-economic fabric of Afghanistan by killing a large number of its citizens and forcing an
even greater number into exile. Although, the state appeared relatively strong from the outside,
it gradually lost much of its legitimacy with the population, becoming vulnerable to more
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rebellions and teetering on the edge of failure. After clinging onto power for over a decade, the
cutoff in Soviet aid, finally forced the regime to succumb to economic and military pressures,
and transfer power to the Mujahedin groups.
According to Rotberg’s and FP’s indicators, while the Afghan state under the Sovietbacked regime appeared to be failing, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
under the Mujahedin led to state collapse. Lack of socio-political cohesion and persistent
fighting among the warring Mujahedin groups left the central government too weak to assert its
authority outside the capital. Constant shelling of the capital city by rival factions, lack of
revenue, and the increasing dominance of local and regional strongmen made it impossible for
the state to provide any political goods or establish its monopoly on the use of force. 58
Under Mujahedin rule, warlord militia groups enjoyed a free reign to perpetuate violence
and did not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. From 1992 through 1994,
they killed between 40,000 to 50,000 civilians in the course of fighting in an around Kabul alone.
The state practically ceased to function and citizens were left to fend for themselves.
Lawlessness, chaos, and warlordism prevailed until the emergence of the Taliban in 1996. The
former UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi described the situation in Afghanistan under Mujahedin
rule as “a failed state which looks like an infected wound. You don’t even know where to start
cleaning it.”59
Socio-political fragmentation was deepened as complex and delicate relationships of
power and authority built up over centuries had completely broken down and there was no one
single leader with enough legitimacy to reunite the warring factions. The dilapidation of state
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gave way to kinship-tribal based and territorial identities, diminishing an already weak national
identity. Moreover, Afghanistan’s tribal hierarchy that once mediated conflicts was weakened
by war and the migration of educated elites resulted in the lack of a political class that could help
reach consensus. Consistent with FP’s social indicators of a failed state, a massive number of
Afghans had become refugees due to violence and repression.60

61

Moreover, consistent with

conditions in a collapsed state, all warring factions during the Mujahedin rule enjoyed relatively
equal strength and waged bloody battles against one another in order to advance their ethnic and
political interests, plunging Afghanistan into political chaos and disorder.
These bleak conditions gave rise to the puritanical Taliban that reclaimed the state’s
monopoly on the use of force in most of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the only semblance of state
under the Taliban would continue to remain their monopoly on the use of brutal force until their
ouster in 2001. Taliban leaders as former refugees in Pakistani religious schools engendered
their own narrow interpretation of Islam with little regard for Afghanistan’s culture or history.
The Taliban after assuming power refused to establish a state structure and discriminated against
ethnic minorities by removing them from positions of authority. As Ghani points out,
“ istorically, despite the seeming dominance of the Pashtuns, the actual process of state-building
entailed the participation of the elite of all ethnic groups and a prominent role paled by nonPashtuns in both the bureaucracy and the military.”62 He adds that the Taliban were bucking the
entire trend of Afghan history because they didn’t understand it.
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Nevertheless, Taliban’s embodiment of a harsh religious state and their Pashtun tribal
ethos enabled the group to prevail not only against the secular and modernizing currents in
Afghan society but also against adherents of mainstream Islam who called for the restructuring
of government and society in the context of the contemporary world.

63

Many Afghans found it

difficult to accept the Taliban rule because the state was characterized by its brutality and heavyhanded approach toward society in general and non-Pashtuns in particular. In line with Rotberg’s
and FP’s indicators, the government’s provision of security to residents living in almost all of
Afghanistan, however, shifted the country from a collapsed state under Mujahedin rule to a failed
state under Taliban regime. Despite its monopoly on the use of force and control of 90 percent
of the Afghan territory, the Taliban government lacked organizations, and other mechanisms that
reflected a certain level of popular participation.64 The absence of almost all attributes of a
functioning state also inhibited the Taliban to pursue a coherent foreign policy. Hence, the only
objective of the Taliban government’s haphazard foreign policy was to gain international
recognition in order to establish its legitimacy among the Afghan public. 65
In contrast to Realism’s claim that the state’s primary objective is to conduct foreign
policy and that domestic politics play a supplementary role for sustaining the state’s goals on the
international arena, failed states are too occupied by domestic woes to pursue a coherent foreign
policy. This is best illustrated by the foreign policies of the Taliban government in Afghanistan
and the interim Iraqi authority after the ouster of the Saddam Hussein government.

63
64

Ewans, Afghanistan, 195.
Ibid., 212–213.

65

William Maley, The Foreign Policy of the Taliban, Muslim Politics Project (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1999), 7–8.

109

In light of the dilapidated nature of the Afghan state under the Taliban regime, the
Afghan state lacked almost all resources and capacities required for the formulation and
implementation of a coherent foreign policy. Thus, the government’s foreign policy was limited
to gaining international recognition in order to compensate for its deficiencies and dwindling
legitimacy in Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban government’s best efforts, however, international
recognition eluded them until their ouster in 2001. They were recognized only by Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates and Pakistan as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.66 As Maley
asserts, “The Taliban have not produced any comprehensive foreign policy manifesto; and
foreign policy attitudes and initiatives are often to be detected only from radio broadcasts, or
from letters sent to international agencies such as the UN. To speak of a Taliban 'foreign policy
establishment' would imply an absurdly greater degree of organizational coherence than the
movement manifests.”67
The case of Iraq is similar to Afghanistan and other failed states in that it illustrates the
constraints failed states face in pursuing a coherent foreign policy. In the wake of Saddam
Hussein government’s ouster from power and the occupation of Iraq by a multinational force, the
Iraqi government faced a multitude of challenges including the loss of its sovereignty, a
dilapidated infrastructure, sectarian tensions and a formidable insurgency. In short, Iraq was a
failed state with the survival of the state hanging in the balance, severely limiting its ability to
formulate a coherent foreign policy. The sudden collapse of the Iraqi state under Saddam
Hussein had created a situation where forces of all stripes, political, sectarian and tribal were
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determined to exploit it for their own agendas. Soffar asserts that since Iraq was still reeling
from the collapse of its state institutions, especially its security apparatus, it had no choice but to
rely on the occupying multinational force to ensure the state’s survival against mainly domestic
threats. In light of these challenges, Iraq’s foreign policy objectives were quite limited in scope
and centered on two goals only, namely sovereignty and economic construction. In the absence
of real power and sovereignty, the government of Iraq was seeking to use international
diplomacy to gradually reclaim its sovereignty and bolster its legitimacy among those citizens
who considered the state to be a creation of the invading foreign forces. Soffar notes, “That
foreign policy is devised as a tool for the creation, rather than a manifestation of sovereignty can
be understood from the foreign minister’s instrumentalization of the concepts of international
legitimacy and internal legitimacy.”68
The interim government of Iraq through international legitimacy hoped to create internal
legitimacy for the interim government in the minds of the Iraqi public, particularly those Iraqis
who had decided to fight the government under the pretext of resisting the occupation of their
country and a puppet Iraqi government.

Soffar contends that it was in this fashion that

diplomacy became vital in bestowing sovereignty and legitimacy on the new government of Iraq.
The Iraqi government’s second foreign policy objective, economic reconstruction, sought to
build the government’s real legitimacy after its symbolic projection through international
recognition. Based on the Iraqi government’s calculation, the provision of basic services and
social welfare could raise public confidence in the government and bolster its legitimacy,
something it desperately needed to consolidate its position and establish its predominance among
other forces competing for social control. Despite its wealth, long years of economic sanctions
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and mismanagement had devastated Iraq’s economy and infrastructure. Iraq lagged behind even
in vital sectors such as gas and oil and suffered from brain drain of its technical experts.69
The examples of Afghanistan and Iraq elucidate that failed states are generally too
inundated by domestic challenges to pursue or even formulate coherent foreign policy objectives.
In the absence of real power, failed states often use foreign policy only as a tool for gaining
domestic legitimacy. As Saffar asserts, “With no sword of its own, the government in Iraq is left
only with the word to build the cosmion; hence the indispensability of foreign policy for the
survival of the Iraqi state.”70
In summary, Afghanistan’s recent history demonstrates that while weak states can avoid
failure by pursuing policies of non-confrontation with their highly fragmented societies, state
attempts to establish its predominance through swift reforms will trigger a strong backlash from
traditionalists.71 The traditional society, wishing to maintain its dominance, fiercely resisted any
encroachment from the state. The Soviet-backed government’s failure to modernize the Afghan
society, however, was not unprecedented as previous state efforts had met a similar fate, failing
to broaden loyalty from clan-based or tribal networks to a concept of statehood.72

This

underscores the inherent domestic constraints to building viable states in fragmented societies
and their vulnerability to failure as socio-political fragmentation deepens.

69
70
71
72

Ibid., 225–226.
Ibid., 240.
Dupree, Afghanistan, 655–671.
Shahrani, “Afghanistan Can Learn From Its Past.”

112

Prospects for Building a Viable State in Afghanistan
The failure of the Afghan state elucidates that upending a highly delicate balance of
power between a weak state and a highly fragmented, web-like society can intensify the struggle
for social control, lead to conflict and ultimately threaten the integrity of the state. State strength
in an environment of conflict is largely dependent on its ability to exercise social control. The
more currency the state possesses, that is compliance, participation and legitimation, the higher
its level of social control to achieve state goals. Higher levels of social control allow the state to
gain autonomy from other social groups by setting rules of the society, and carrying on with state
goals.73 As demonstrated in Chapter II, state capacity and particularly its ability to pursue state
goals is directly related to the structure of its society. Migdal asserts, “The ineffectiveness of
state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the
nature of the societies they have confronted, from the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords,
bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders, and other strongmen through various social organizations.”74
The struggle for social control is even more pronounced in non-Western societies where
the capabilities of the state cannot be understood without first gaining a good understanding of
the state’s social structure. Fragile countries such as Afghanistan have faced significant
challenges in establishing the predominance of the state because many structures conflict with
one another over how social life should be ordered. In countries where social control is highly
fragmented, the society’s influence on the state is more apparent. Given the Afghan state’s
limited capacity and structural support, a significant level of social control has remained with
regional strongmen and tribal leaders. Thus, as long as these strongmen continue to offer viable
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strategies for survival to members of their ethnic and tribal groups, the Afghan is likely to garner
minimal support since there is little motivation for the population to support the state.75
Boege et al findings suggest that while the process of state formation in Western societies
were undertaken over a period of centuries, this model was delivered relatively swiftly to many
parts of the non-Western world since decolonization era. Consequently, the Weberian model of
nation-state lacks roots in recipient societies such as Afghanistan. These findings also indicate
that the delivery of the Weberian model was not accompanied by the development of the
economic, political, social and cultural structures and capacities that had provided the basis and
framework for creating an efficient and functional political order during European states’
evolution. In conflicted societies such as Afghanistan, concepts such as “citizen” and “state” do
not generate cultural resonance, as most people are relatively disconnected from the state, neither
expecting much from state institutions nor willing to fulfill obligations toward them.
Understanding what constitutes true political order in fragile regions, therefore, becomes even
more relevant as attempts to transpose a Weberian nation-state model have faced significant
challenges in many non-Western societies.76
British funding for the creation of a nation-state model in Afghanistan in the 1800s,
followed by sizeable American and Soviet assistance in the 1950s and 1960s, and the subsequent
Soviet patronage of the Afghan regime in the 1970s and 1980s, suggest that building of a
relatively functional, albeit weak state in Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on rentier
income in the form of foreign assistance. The absence of such support coupled with deepening
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social and political fragmentation, as illustrated during the two decades of the Afghan conflict,
leaves the state vulnerable to failure and even collapse.
Nevertheless, as the Soviet patronage in the 1980s illustrates, funding by foreign
benefactors alone will not be enough to help support the creation of a viable state. Any such
foreign assistance ought to be coupled with state efforts to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the emergent and existing local and regional self-governing communities, and pay particular
attention to their legitimate fears and concerns regarding their ties to the national governance
structures. As Migdal and Salame point out, strong societies such as Afghanistan are “not putty
to be modeled by states with sufficient technical resources, managerial abilities and committed
personnel”. 77 The strength of shared memories and beliefs within various subunits such as the
clans, tribes, linguistic, groups, and ethnic groups puts forward an image for societies in many
developing countries that are quite different from the centralized structures found in advanced
countries. 78
Further complicating the prospects of building a relatively viable state in Afghanistan is
what Nordlinger calls the necessity of rapidly forming a national identity before the central
government has come into existence as it may alleviate the strains and conflicts that dwarf the
development of a viable of state. As a deeply tribal and fragmented society, it remains highly
unlikely that a strong Afghan national identity can be rapidly formed. This process would
involve a fundamental alteration in the loyalties of the people whose only attachment was
previously given to sub-national groups. In the absence of national identity, feelings of ethnic
oppression and degradation can only be compounded during the process of institutionalization as
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seen during King Amanullah Khan’s reign and the Soviet-backed government’s efforts to
modernize the society. The institutionalization process signaled the presence and predominance
of the incumbents as perceived by traditional communities, prompting them to resist. 79
The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that the Afghan state, despite
assistance from foreign benefactors, will probably continue to remain weak and embody a
system of government that is based more on kinship and patronage befitting a tribal society
rather than a rational-legal system based on the Weberian nation-state model. A weak Afghan
state is likely to compete for social control within its web-like society that hosts a mélange of
fairly autonomous social organizations, underlying the fractionalization between developing
nations and elsewhere.80 Realism’s focus on the state’s outward behavior largely ignores the
state’s origins and composition. The formation of a legitimate state presupposes that citizens
regard the state to serve as the ultimate political authority. However, as the failure of the Afghan
state has demonstrated, the state for more than two decades was characterized by socio-political
fragmentation and had lost its overarching authority and legitimacy. This underlines the point
that not all states are deeply rooted in the social, cultural and political identity of the nation or
enjoy the same level of legitimacy, a key ingredient for a establishing a viable state.81
The Afghan state will continue to face significant hurdles in asserting its dominance
when the very model it represents is viewed with suspicion.82 As the failure of the Afghan state
illustrates, while the Realist theory’s emphasis on the centrality of state may be sufficient in
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explaining state behavior in homogenous, stable, and developed nations, it’s not adequate in
delineating the behavior of non-Western, weak states that remain vulnerable to failure with
considerable impact on international relations.
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